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“Mutual Dependence” and Subversive Work: Exploring Dialectics of Race, Gender, and Labor in the Antebellum United States

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When viewed, therefore, as a connected whole, and as flowing on with incessant renewal, every social process of production is, at the same time, a process of reproduction.

—Karl Marx, Capital I, chap. 23

The period just before the U.S. Civil War is marked, in Marxist terms, by the collision of the feudal and capitalist modes of production; in feminist terms, by the emergence of separate spheres and the ideology of domesticity; and, in the terms of historians and theorists of race, by the emergence of the structuring of subjectivity by racial formations. This essay attempts to demonstrate the interactive processes of these historical conditions as they are divulged in readings of The Pioneers by James Fenimore Cooper and Our Nig by Harriet E. Wilson, and the developing industrial class formation.

The purpose is to use a materialist framework to explore the dialectical formation of labor as the basis of social identity in this emergent social formation as well as to demonstrate foundational material and cultural resistances and rebellious acts that transformed hierarchies at work in this period. Ultimately, the particular characters, subordinated by the hierarchies found in these
novels, prefigure larger social transformations through their own fictional acts and, historically, through corresponding collective subversions of social relations.

Although the choice of texts and events discussed may appear arbitrary, Cooper and Wilson serve as useful chronological bookends for this period. Additionally, this essay shows how Cooper’s *Pioneers* and Wilson’s *Our Nig* are good examples of opposed ideological imaginings of the structures of the antebellum social formation. Written in 1823, Cooper’s novel imagines and romanticizes a crumbling feudal past as industrial capitalism emerges ultimately to organize social life. On the other hand, Wilson’s novel works to represent accurately the racial formation and gendered division of labor that has become identified as central to emerging antebellum capitalism. Thus, *Our Nig* (1859) can be understood as the dialectical negation of the ideological messages of the bourgeois imaginary mobilized by *The Pioneers*. Not surprisingly, however, Cooper’s work moved to the center of American letters, while Wilson slid into obscurity.

**The Pioneers: Rebellion on the frontier**

James Fenimore Cooper’s 1823 novel *The Pioneers* is now sometimes read exclusively as a racist, imperialist rendering of the early U.S. frontier. Like most of Cooper’s work, the novel elaborates an early American class hierarchy, patriarchal order, and racial formation founded on white male capitalist authority (although he shrouds his version of emerging industrial capitalism in feudalistic forms). In a detailed biography of William Cooper, James Fenimore’s father, Alan Taylor draws strong parallels between the Cooperstown of James’s youth and “his most powerful memories” found in the Leatherstocking tales, especially *The Pioneers*. According to Taylor, Cooper sought to reclaim “his legacy by imagining and crafting an improved past,” a past that alleviated “genteel” anxieties (his own and those of his social class) about rapid social transformation in the revolutionary period. He tried to reconstruct a world stabilized by a patriarch whose authority tamed the anarchistic elements lurking at the frontier (1995, 418–19). The historical William Cooper (Marmaduke Temple of
the novel) attempted to build a community based in, as he put it, “mutual dependence,” an imagined organic whole uniting all of its members in a single common cause of production, distribution, and culture-building in the frontiers of western New York. Historically this community was based in class hierarchy because Cooper owned the land and its resources. He rented these resources to settlers, creating various levels of debt peonage and dependence on him (104). Ultimately, challengers to his economic and political authority dismantled his control of the region, and left the son to reclaim the imagined stability of his father’s generation.

In order to produce his literary hierarchies, in which social betters are the protagonists of a romanticized past, Cooper also introduces racialized and gendered “others” within his text. Those typically examined are Natty Bumppo, Chingachgook, and Elizabeth Temple, the daughter of the wealthy patron. For our analysis here, however, Betty Hollister, a minor dependent female character, deserves attention. She is a woman dependent on her labor and that of her husband for her living. Though fixed within a hierarchy of class, gender, and race (the latter two the means through which her class position is articulated by Cooper), Mrs. Hollister provides an example of a challenge to the arrangements of station and power depicted by Cooper.

First, her “station” (her social position and the concomitant social power available to her), is determined simultaneously by her gender and race, but more directly by her labor as a tavern-keeper. This becomes clear when one compares Mrs. Hollister to Elizabeth, the economically secure daughter of the owner of the valley, and Louisa, the economically dependent daughter of the minister. Both labor in a confined domestic sphere (Elizabeth’s labor being limited to giving directions to servants) and are higher in station and active social authority (though still constrained by the public and private authority of the patriarch) than Mrs. Hollister. In fact, the station of a genteel woman derived from the economic ability to avoid public labor—if not, in fact, the rigors of domestic work. Although Betty Hollister is married to a petty bourgeois tavern-keeper, her gender proletarianizes her in the tavern because she does not own or legally control her workplace or the means of
production. Her husband, although he may not gain social power by physically subordinating his rebellious, masculine wife, does expropriate her wealth production for himself.

Mrs. Hollister’s very reliance on labor and the continuum of her labor’s transgression of the ideological barrier between the private and public realms thus ascribes to her the textual characterization of masculinity. As the Judge and his daughter make their way through the town on the way to Christmas eve services, the Hollisters greet them. It is Mrs. Hollister, with her “masculine countenance” and “masculine strides,” who stops the Judge’s sleigh and speaks first to the Temples, asking for directions on how to prepare for the celebration of Christmas. Further, feminine clothing only confuses her manly appearance. The narrator comments that she wore “the mockery of a ruffled cap, that was intended to soften the lineaments of features that were by no means squeamish” (Cooper 1968, 155–56). “Captain” Hollister remains in the background of this scene. The “sargeant,” as Mrs. Hollister refers to her revolutionary-war-veteran husband, is used to following the directions of his wife (199–200). Further, the Judge’s butler refers to the tavern as “Betty Hollister’s warm room” (234). Mrs. Hollister may command the life of the tavern and cross the lines between the separate spheres staked out by the notion of domesticity, but her legal power is demarcated by marriage. Culturally, Cooper’s depiction of her as masculine, as potentially unstable, and as abnormal circumscribes her social worth. In this manner, her gender, mediated by her class position and laboring condition, is blurred and resembles male members of her class in the novel.

She deploys this masculinity, however, in particular ways that may disrupt, at least, or rearrange the neatly packaged social hierarchy of Cooper’s world. In the text, masculinity provides her with temporary authority over her workplace and access to public realms, which at the time were dominated by men, as David Conroy has shown in his study of early American tavern-keeping. Before the Revolution, women—usually widows—were authorized to own taverns in order to provide for themselves materially and stay off the public dole. As Conroy demonstrates, however,
newly independent American elites, fearful of the potentially socially disruptive nature of the tavern as a political organizing site, sought to exert greater control over tavern ownership. By the time of the events of this novel, women had been forced out of what little control of the industry they held and into publicly funded institutions for their upkeep. Materially advantaged women found new political power in the temperance movement, in churches, and primarily in the domestic sphere (Conroy 1995, 310–22).³

Mrs. Hollister apparently refuses to adhere to the rules of the new order as she unapologetically engages in conversations with her customers on topics such as religion, law, and the political direction of the Templeton community (Cooper 1968, 204–12). This gender crossing, in Cooper’s mind far from significant to the movement of the plot, simply gives the Templeton community quaint characters from which his readers could draw lessons about social order, social station, and America’s civilizing mission.

In the larger structural perspective, Elizabeth Temple also accomplishes a sort of gender crossing. Where then is the difference? Elizabeth’s moral rebellion against her father is necessary for the movement and climax of the plot, is easily forgiven by her father once his patriarchal order is restored, and is the basis of Elizabeth’s attractive heroics (if they can be described as such). By helping to free Natty and Edwards, Elizabeth risks both the patriarchal authority of her father and the “civilizing” mission implicit in his instruction that “the laws alone remove us from the condition of the savages” (535). Ultimately, Elizabeth’s subversion of her father’s authority works to restore order, provide genteel justice for highly stationed, though misunderstood, characters, and renders her own potential economic authority impossible. Her loyalty to Edwards, against her father’s wishes, leads to their marriage and his ownership and control of her father’s property.

Mrs. Hollister’s action in the novel, on the other hand, includes the formation of a failed looting party of “20 curious boys” intent on expropriating a share of the rumored wealth hidden in the mountains of the Judge’s property (Cooper 1968, 605–6)³ Upon the failure of the endeavor, Cooper characterizes Mrs.
Hollister as a comical character who nags her husband for his own clumsy exploits. She is then rendered invisible throughout the rest of the text and is presumably sewn up with the rest of the plot in Cooper’s neat social imaginary. The hierarchical structure of Cooper’s text contains and renders farcical what could have been an expression of collective struggle to subvert the social arrangements of property and the way wealth is accumulated.

Additionally, the role of Captain Hollister and his relationship with Betty point up significantly divergent gender- and class-based positions and loyalties that appeared in early nineteenth-century America. In the British colonies, the militia muster had since the seventeenth century served as a basis for rallying white men of different economic classes to the banner of patriarchy and white supremacy (Brown 1996, 137–86). By the early nineteenth century, leadership of the militia fell to the petty bourgeoisie, and this modicum of social power effectively deflected criticism by this class of its social superiors. Additionally, as Arno J. Mayer has argued, the petty bourgeoisie became economically dependent on the emerging capitalist class. Thus when democratic movements arose threatening the legitimacy and position of elites, people like Hollister could be counted on to suppress such tendencies (Mayer 1975, 414–16).

In Cooper’s novel, Hollister follows this historically assigned task, forging a powerful disjuncture based on class between himself and his wife, reproducing the patriarchal status quo, and comically contributing to the preservation of elite hegemony. Yet Hollister’s military role, aside from its ritualistic element of calling out the militia to defend the social order, is unnecessary. The legitimacy of the established system of hierarchies, according to Cooper’s plot, is ultimately preserved through the revelation of truth about the aristocratic identity of Edwards and his secrets, not Hollister’s military prowess. In fact, the enlistment of the petty bourgeoisie serves only as an act of deference to the entrenched social arrangements of power. Although Judge Temple gives discursive deference throughout the novel to the law and his powerlessness to go against its dictates (533–35), and although he scrupulously avoids being present at the militia muster to pursue
Natty and Edwards (597), it is clear that he alone wields power to halt the chaos unleashed. Ultimately, he observes that legal forms designed to pretend democratic justice exists are in the hands of incompetents such as Hollister (and other social inferiors), and that he alone “command[s] the peace” (608). Thus, the fragility of Hollister’s social position is exposed temporarily and further revealed and delighted in by his wife. Chiding him for failing to conduct himself bravely and successfully and for being “nothing but a shabby captain of malaishy [militia],” Betty is not reproducing patriarchy, but indicating her husband’s inability to control the radical collective movement against the established social order. She points up the class division and gender loyalties that had fractured the camaraderie presumably formed by their marriage, possibly suggesting his soldierly efforts might be better guided by “the raal captain” as they had been in the Revolution (605–6).

**Women as factory workers**

While the first copies of Cooper’s novel were being read, 1824 saw another kind of collective action, in a different historical context and social formation from that in the novel—the struggle against the economic exploitation of factory labor in Pawtucket, Rhode Island. Textile manufacturers, in an effort to raise profits, cut the amount of time allotted for meals and reduced the rate for unskilled piecework. According to labor historian Gary B. Kulik, the textile factories in Pawtucket employed most of the industrial working-class population in the town. Around thirty percent of the factory laborers were women. Further, women were an even larger proportion of the factory population of unskilled laborers affected by the piece-rate cuts. It seems that the factory owners consciously sought to divide their workers along gender lines, believing that skilled male workers would not concern themselves with the working conditions of the female workers.

In separate meetings, the skilled male laborers voted to strike unless previous working hours were reestablished, and the women workers agreed to strike unless their wages were returned to the old piece rates. Collectively the Pawtucket textile workers took to the streets, closed the mills, and even visited the homes of the
manufacturers to make their demands known. With wide popular support for the strike, the manufacturers felt obliged to make concessions and reestablished the usual working hours. Then the alliance broke down. Because the manufacturers recognized the union, the skilled male workers remained legally organized, but failed to respond to the owners’ decision to keep the cut piece rates (specifically for female workers). Without this crucial alliance, the unskilled workers were forced to return to the job without success. So an important class alliance was dissolved because intraclass differences of skill were articulated as gender differences. The result was a hierarchy within the newly emerging industrial working class based on traditional men’s and women’s roles (Kulik 1979; Foner 1979).

These role definitions, the result of the ideology of domesticity, do not coincide with the realities of white working-class women’s lives in the mid-nineteenth century. It seems to be clear that women in early industrializing America were responsible for both domestic and public production in order to sustain themselves and their families. According to women’s labor historian Carole Turbin, this position did not have to hinder struggle but, in fact, could provide a location from which women laborers could stand at the forefront of class struggle dialectically linked to struggles against male supremacy, whether in union leadership, as rank-and-file members, or as supporters of union work (Turbin 1987). These facts demonstrate not only the concrete reality of the continuum of public and private labor, but also the recognition of that fact by white working women and the use of labor as subject position from which active resistance to exploitation could take place.

On the other hand, these facts also indicate the persistence of divisions in the alliance of women and men necessary in order to make an effective movement. Further, white male workers expressed these fractions in terms of male paternal control over the emerging labor movement, and white women workers in this movement deployed a kind of feminist resistance to their male “benefactors” in addition to a class-based opposition to capitalist exploitation (Foner 1979, 38–54; Stansell 1986, 137–49; see also...
Ultimately, as was the case for some of the first union movements in New York, the failure of female labor associations can be directly linked to the refusal of male workers to countenance feminist critiques as necessary to a dialectical understanding of the total structure of exploitation and oppression in the early industrial United States. As one writer for the labor newspaper *The World* argued, the Working Woman’s Association failed because its leaders believed that men and women’s interests were “divergent” and that the feminist goals of the organization were “a perversion of its efforts into indirect and unprofitable channels” (Janiewski 1976, 786). In this manner, progressive white male leaders blamed class disunity on non-class-based social criticism.

Although the similarities between the emerging union movement and the result of lower-class revolt in Cooper’s *Pioneers* are apparent in the ways in which dissent by subordinates is rendered invisible or ineffectual for the sake of preserving white male privilege (both cultural and material), stark contrasts also dialectically surface. As Alexander Saxton has shown, “the primary thrusts” of Cooper’s heroes are imperialist, antiprogressive, and antimodernist, and are concerned “with reaffirm[ing] the politics of deference” (1990, 193–94). Natty Bumppo’s purpose, as Saxton contends, was to allow Cooper to imagine a popular hero who helped conserve the authority of ruling elites, pave the way for civilization, reinforce racial hierarchies, and contrast with and critique lower-class revolt. But as Cooper constructed such an ideological stage, the symbolic role of being at the vanguard of American imperialism and paving the way for civilization in which Bumppo engages links him dialectically to the presence of dissent and revolt symbolized in Betty Hollister. The social space available for her subversive activities is directly created by Bumppo’s legitimation of an older aristocratic claim to property (based on England’s imperial control of its possessions in North America) and the confluence of events set into motion and structured by the social relations of the novel. Although race also allies her with Bumppo’s overarching project of spearheading American expansion and will tend to dissolve counterhegemonic alliances
across race and gender lines, her figurative presence grows and foreshadows the subversion of the feudal economic arrangements and gender hierarchies ideologically preserved in Cooper’s novel. While Cooper sought to defend the social order based on deference, his socially inferior characters (“Jacksonian democrats”) and those of the emerging union movement began to dismantle such an ideology (Saxton 1990, 194). In fact, the sense of rebellion against feudal forms of deference embodied in Mrs. Hollister foreshadows the emergence of market capitalism arising in ideological revolt against Cooper’s “natural” hierarchical social order. This ideological revolt would also be accompanied by new social relations in which the merchant class of small producers would sometimes gain against the large landholders of Temple’s milieu, in some cases becoming the new bourgeoisie.

Another set of contrasts also appears as the ideologies and practices of patriarchy became differentiated by class and race. As the development of public women’s labor clashed with the ideology of domesticity, members of the emerging middle class borrowed the discourse of gender hierarchies, racial differentiation, and economic class to express its new social status. As is familiar to most of us, this ideology explained the split between the public realm of men and the domestic realm of women, assumed the naturalness of emerging bourgeois social relations, and obscured the nagging question of which men and which women gained in the “new world.” Economically secure women found themselves exempt from the necessity of performing “productive” labor for a wage, and many found respite from the domestic, unpaid labor in their homes because they could afford servants and slaves (Kessler-Harris 1981, 35–44; see also, Katzman 1978, Welter 1973, Glenn 1997). But most women who found themselves employed in the “public” sector or who did unpaid “productive” labor at home were certainly not members of the economic elite. The ideology of domesticity provided a model of womanhood which affluent white women could trade in for less work, which prevented most working women (white and of color) from identifying their class interests with male workers, and which actually demanded more from them in the home. Further, employers expected “compliant
behavior among women” workers because the ideology of domesticity contributed to the view that their jobs were “transient” and their wages “supplemental.” They were expected to marry soon and leave the labor force because their real interests lay at home (Kessler-Harris 1981, 63; Turbin 1987, 48–50).

An examination of these issues of separate spheres and the site of domesticity as a location of struggle over class, the meanings of racial hierarchy, and gender difference provides a unique insight into how working-class alliances are made and disrupted by articulations of gender and race. In Cooper’s The Pioneers, the historical construction of domestic service as gendered and racialized points to early industrial hierarchies in U.S. life and culture. Nonelite white women articulated the ability to set oneself above the waged and dependent domestic on the terrain of race. Both Mrs. Hollister and Remarkable Pettibone, the Judge’s housekeeper, assert racial difference in order to secure for themselves a modicum of social power arranged through the “natural” hierarchies. Mrs. Hollister, in describing their African American employee Jude, as “the lazy black baste,” asserts her own racial prominence, voiding Jude’s ability to participate in any collective identification with Mrs. Hollister as a laboring subordinate to her husband and to the aristocratic hierarchy in Templeton (200). In so doing, Mrs. Hollister discursively organizes the possibility of Jude’s collective alliance with Remarkable Pettibone based in their common laboring position. Against this, however, Remarkable foreshadows the discursive outlines of working-class republicanism when, reflecting on Elizabeth’s arrival into the Judge’s household, she finds “the idea of being governed, or of being compelled to pay the deference of servitude . . . absolutely intolerable.” She further articulates servitude and deference in terms of race: in response to the butler’s suggestion that Elizabeth will be her mistress, Remarkable remarks, “Mistress! . . . don’t make one out to be a nigger” (231–41). This racialized assertion of independence precludes alliances based in class with nonwhite workers and assumes the likelihood of class collaboration with other whites on issues not immediately discernible as economically in the interest of white workers.
Further, as Elizabeth’s presence demotes Remarkable from surrogate mother to paid domestic laborer in the Temple household, and she marks such a move as a slip in the racial hierarchy, Remarkable is asserting a racialized characteristic of domestic labor. This “racial division of paid reproductive labor,” as Evelyn Nakano Glenn calls it (1997, 113), and the reproduction of hierarchical class-differentiated ideologies and practices point up the difficulty of dialectically understanding the material links between and among racial and gender oppressions that formed significant bases of working-class culture. These links can be interpreted as either the mystifying effects of exchange values assigned to racial positions vis-à-vis labor (i.e., labor assigned both a cash value and a social, racial, and gender value) or as the conscious decision of white workers to benefit materially and socially from whiteness—probably both.

These contradictions can be traced in some important ways to the republican tradition and the limits of the contests over its meanings. Bourgeois republicans envisioned a society in the United States that preached political equality but limited such power for white property holders. As industrializing capitalism produced a nonpropertied, proletarianized class of free white men, this ideology was reworked by the forming dominant racialized and gendered elements of the working class. Embedded within this version of republican ideology was the notion of possession and ownership of knowledge, of skill, and of labor itself (Saxton, 1976, 37; Stansell 1986, 190; Schultz 4ff; Roediger 1991, 45). Possession and ownership, the original location of political, cultural, and ideological authority, had been exchanged to mean not the legal possession of real property, nor the collective ownership of the means of production, but the symbolic property of knowledge and labor within each individual laborer. White working-class women extended this notion further to elaborate a feminine republicanism apart from the middle-class ideology of domesticity but also apart from that of their masculine class counterparts, though contained usually by white, working-class male paternalism (Stansell 1986, 146–47).

At the same time, however, as David Roediger has shown, this notion of possession and ownership reinforced the racial
boundaries delineated by free and slave labor. White workers, on the whole, came to identify themselves as not-slave, not-Black, and thus imbued naturally with the political privileges of the republican society. As Roediger argues, even the lowliest white worker could invoke the language of possession and ownership of labor in order to make gains in wages and have a voice within the political coalitions that dominated electoral politics. Without “necessarily requir[ing] a structural solution,” he notes, “[w]hite workers could be treated better—reforms could occur,” (1991, 73). Thus economic equality in the new republican state were symbolically and materially exchanged for simple possession and ownership of labor, a collective, cross-class and cross-gender racialized white identity, and, for white working women, a tenuous and short-lived independence from patriarchal versions of women’s labor (43–60; see also Stansell 1986, 151–53).10 Whiteness itself became a virtuous and politically enabling republican possession.

Our Nig and its ideological attack

Possession of labor became contested, in the pre–Civil War period, as the primary ideological framework for explaining conditions and the possibilities of resistance to hierarchies of social and political power. When contextualized by the language of white republicanism and bourgeois notions of the ideology of domesticity, Harriet E. Wilson’s short novel Our Nig provides particular subversions of dominant, though structurally differentiated, values. Further, it represents a sustained attack on the whiteness of possession and the republican ideological language that contained the debate on labor in the antebellum United States. Wilson’s novel tells the story of Frado, a child of mixed racial parentage who, because of the extreme poverty and social marginalization of her parents, enters a white, lower-middle-class household to serve as a domestic laborer. The story’s primary thrust is to blur the supposedly clear distinction between free Northern labor and enslaved Southern labor as the general characteristic of African American labor in the United States. Simultaneously, the novel asserts the contradictions embedded in white readings of Christianity and liberal humanism when structured by the violence of racialized domesticity and the
expropriation of surplus value from labor. It, then, imagines the possibility of human liberation unmarked by racial and gender oppression and unbounded by the inequalities of a capitalist organization of labor-power as an expropriated commodity.

These dialectically linked critiques are divulged through the novel’s form. This is not to suggest a primacy of form over content or even a theoretical unity of the two, but rather to suggest that the material conditions, the social relations, and lived experiences—its content—elaborated in the work necessarily complicate Wilson’s use of traditional literary forms. Aside from the written content (its critique), Wilson’s manipulations of form underscore the unspoken, possibly utopian elements lurking beyond the critique. Thus, critical examination of the novel’s form helps to organize a reading of its content (Eagleton 1976, 20–36). The use of both the elements of sentimental fiction created by white women in the antebellum period and the blurred use of fictional autobiography, as Henry Louis Gates notes, suggest a particular relation to both forms but with “curious rupture[s]” (Gates 1987, 126). Combining elements both of the sentimental novel and the slave narrative, the novel relies on the “openness of motives” without negating “aggression or self-esteem” and the will to act out freedom (143).

Additionally, as Elizabeth J. West argues, the novel also performs and subverts the formalistic elements of the conversion narrative strongly linked to “popular notions of womanhood and domesticity” especially found in the captivity narrative pervasive in the sentimental tradition (1999, 3). West identifies an “interdependence” between “Christian doctrine and literary constructions of womanhood,” arguing that the ultimate salvation motif of the conversion narrative finds its way into the sentimental novel through salvation of an exposed dependent character. Because Wilson’s protagonist refuses to give in to conversion, however, the novel exposes the contradictions of religious ideals and their ideological purposes. West argues that the independence of Wilson’s voice, not Christianity, provides the ultimate salvation (10–11). An important caveat to West’s analysis should be noted. Because, as Gates points out, Wilson’s novel is not simply
voice or speech but an act of labor embedded in a desperate and ultimately failed gesture to save her son and herself, salvation does not happen and her voice is ignored until 130 years after she spoke. In this manner, the form of the novel serves to provide a narrative space in which to critique Northern racism without conflating it with chattel slavery or eliminating the agency of the racialized laboring subject, to critique the Christian ideological messages interwoven with white elite notions of womanhood and domesticity. Also, since form “ideologically circumscribes” content, Wilson’s use and subversion of multiple forms imply a lack of, or at least fractured, ideological loyalty to the “naturalness” or benevolence of existing social relations in antebellum America (Eagleton 1976, 26).11

Beyond these generic forms, the novel performs and contains a series of redundancies12 that help the reader negotiate a wide space between humanism, embodied in ostensibly good characters, and sadism, enacted by the most obviously brutal characters. This space is neither empty nor arbitrary, however. The careful reader will bump repeatedly into the interactive material processes of racial and gender oppression and economic expropriation of labor’s surplus value as well as the ideological underpinnings for those social relations. For example, the first of several redundancies that relate to the Bellmont household in which Frado is abandoned by her impoverished and socially outcast interracial parents is the opposition of Mr. Bellmont’s “kind, humane” qualities and Mrs. Bellmont’s disposition described as “a whirlwind, charged with fire, daggers and spikes” (Wilson 1983, 24–25). Although Mr. Bellmont intervenes several times on Frado’s behalf (to disrupt extremely severe beatings inflicted by Mrs. Bellmont [44,47]; to retrieve Frado’s beloved dog, which Mrs. Bellmont had sold [62]; to allow Frado to attend school [30] and church against the advice of Mrs. Bellmont [89]), he is redundantly described as “silent” (25), as “a man who seldom decided controversies at home” (30–31), as conspicuously absent during Mrs. Bellmont’s rages (34–35), or simply “unable” to prevent Mrs. Bellmont’s cruelty (104).13 Wilson ultimately reveals the false nature of the opposition between these two characters,
however, in a conversation in which Mrs. Bellmont reminds her husband of the “profit” accrued to them from Frado’s labor, which Mr. Bellmont gladly accepted (90).

Such episodes are repeated with each of the “kind” characters: the sons, James and Jack; the nice but invalid daughter, Jane; and the religiously pious Aunt Abby. Although these characters repeatedly sympathize with Frado’s “fate” and sometimes successfully prevent the fullest expressions of Mrs. Bellmont’s wrath, their presence in the novel is also marked by certain incapacities. Aunt Abby is unwilling to risk her precarious position in the household through interference. Jane’s physical weakness and departure through her marriage prevent her sustained assistance on behalf of Frado. John, although he promises to bring Frado with him soon, leaves the household in search of his own fortune. James perpetually promises to take Frado away from his cruel mother, but his sickness and ultimate death prevent such a beneficial action. Notably, Wilson extends the scope of these redundancies to the nonfictional world of “professed abolitionists” who fail to live up their antislavery ideals by ignoring “slavery’s shadow” in the North (129).14

On the surface, these recurrent episodes of failed attempts at kindness engage the sympathy of the reader for the good characters, demonstrating the importance of the benevolent treatment of dependent individuals. Likewise, they superficially invoke the possibility of the alliance of the protagonists against racial prejudice and brutal treatment, in the process preserving the humanity of oppressor and oppressed. Why, then, does the narrator describe Fido, Frado’s dog, as “a more valuable presence than the human beings who surrounded her”? And, why at the dog’s death, does Frado “shed more tears over him than over all beside,” in referring to the deaths of James, whom she loved dearly, and Mary, the cruel daughter of Mrs. Bellmont whose death she celebrated (62, 117)? The formalistic device of redundancy allows Wilson to propose specious differences among the various characters in relation to Frado. The subsequent exposure of the falsity allows her to suggest that privileges derived from occupying dominant positions in existing social relations preclude even the most
humane protagonists from maintaining meaningful alliance with Frado (or in the case of Abolitionists, with free northern African Americans). Wilson’s purpose is to unpack the dialectically linked myriad of social relations that structure the social formation in which she exists and simultaneously debunk the ideological formations that obscure those relations, including liberal humanism, which her rhetorical strategies effectively evade.

One significant ideological formation that Wilson’s story demystifies is the ideology of domesticity in the white household. As we have seen, the achievement of elite status and “true womanhood” rested in significant ways on the ability of a white woman to avoid waged, public labor and to be financially capable of hiring domestic labor in order to confine her own labor to that of management of the household. (It is this ideologically defined space of labor and value in which Mr. Bellmont rarely intervenes.) Mrs. Bellmont recognizes this social value upon Frado’s arrival into the household and quickly injects certain racial assumptions into true womanhood that mark the ideology as not only economically elitist but also as absolutely white. She remarks on the value of Frado’s learning to do her (Mrs. Bellmont’s) work. But then she adds, “I have so much trouble with the girls I hire, I am almost persuaded if I have one to train up in my way from a child, I shall be able to keep them awhile” (26). Mrs. Bellmont suggests that Black women are good only for work:

[Y]ou know these niggers are just like black snakes; you can’t kill them. If she wasn’t tough she would have been killed long ago. There was never one of my girls who could do half the work. (88–89)

The implication here is that other waged, white domestic laborers (which included Frado’s white mother for a short period [9]) display a lack of willingness to submit to Mrs. Bellmont’s sadistic domination. The unspoken assumption is that whiteness induces regular payment, specific limits on terms of service, and the likelihood of job actions (in this instance, quitting) in the event of unfair treatment. In this manner, Mrs. Bellmont’s former white employees severely limited her class authority as well as her ability to perform the trappings of true womanhood. Frado’s membership
in the household, however, though rife with Frado’s own tendency
to rebellion, is unpaid, her term of service is assumed by Mrs.
Bellmont to be eighteen years, and her youth permits of training to
complete submission. Further, in Wilson’s preface to the novel she
suggests that Mrs. Bellmont “was wholly imbued with southern
principles” (Cooper 1968, preface). Taking in Frado enforced her
belief that menial labor can be best performed by racially inferior
workers. Thus, Mrs. Bellmont’s social status as a “true woman”
derives from her exploitative and oppressive dominance of
Frado’s domestic labor. In the North in general, although domes-
tic labor could not be marked exclusively as Black because of the
shortage of available racialized labor, African American working
women for the most part could be designated as domestic labor.
As Philip S. Foner reports, as many as 80 percent of Black work-
ing women in some urban areas earned their living as domestic
servants, while the great majority of the other 20 percent worked
as skilled, though not fairly remunerated, seamstresses (Foner
1974, 4–6). While the indentured status of Frado may not have
been typical of African American women’s labor in the antebel-
lum North, circumscribed opportunities in other fields of work,
extremely low wages, and the racially devalued status of the labor
performed produced similar material effects.

From this narrative, Wilson produces a picture of a complex
dialectically linked web of social relations characterized by an
expropriative positioning of dominance and subordination. Mr.
Bellmont allows his wife’s domestication of the household in order
to preserve her racial and economic status. But he retains for him-
self patriarchal authority and ownership of household production.
Mrs. Bellmont’s control of the domestic sphere means the ability
to extract “profits” in terms of saved labor time, higher returns
from household products through low wages, and social status
as a “true woman.” Wilson further implies the generalization of
these particular relations throughout the North. Bellmont’s liberal
attitudes strongly parallel him with “professed abolitionists,” who
ignored racial prejudice in their own homes and region. Although
he attempts specific kindnesses to Frado, he gains materially from
her continued indentured status. Other liberals of his class may
also have exhibited specific acts of generosity, but were actively complicit in a system of racial hierarchies through the material exploitation of the domestic labor of African American women.\textsuperscript{15} These social relations linked both of the Bellmonts with a wider social class in common class and race interests.

Opposition to this common class interest arose through the employer/employee relation. As noted above, domestic workers were able to deploy a series of resistances to employer domination, and if they were anything like Remarkable Pettibone from *The Pioneers*, they may have deployed a racialized working-class republicanism in the process. Wilson only hints at this, but her narrative works to point up the limits of this labor-based ideology. As noted above, working-class republicanism centered on the ownership and possession of labor (independence) and the whiteness of the worker. Frado’s resistive acts, on the other hand, do not garner for her the same gains in the conditions of her workplace as for her white counterparts. At the same time, however, those acts provide Frado with temporary leisure time, sometimes momentary pleasure in laughter, and on at least one occasion, “the stirring of free and independent thoughts” (Wilson 1983, 105). By feigning interest in church, she gets Mr. Bellmont to agree to allow her time from work to attend church (86–90; see also Gates 1983, xlix). Her prankish antics at school and in the fields provide her with laughter and entertainment as well as a modicum of camaraderie with her audiences (Wilson 1983, 32, 37–39). And, perhaps most importantly, her threatened work stoppage in response to Mrs. Bellmont’s arbitrary violence wins her a momentary victory against a beating and a permanent sense of potentially independent selfhood.

As a young adult, however, Frado despairs of an avenue of escape from the Bellmont household. “She was black, no one would love her” (108). Thus her deliverance comes by way of finding work elsewhere and “becom[ing] expert with her needle the first year of her release from Mrs. B.” (122). After years of sickness and living on the charity of others, she meets a “friend” who “kindly provided her with a valuable recipe” with which she attempts to make a living (129). In this manner, an outside benefactor helps
her to secure independence, though rife with uncertainty. The possession of this skill, although it surpasses the knowledge of her instructor, provides Frado by no means with membership in a leading role of the labor union movement as skill had done for white, male workers in Pawtucket, nor does it provide her access to the social benefits of republican citizenship, nor even the basic right of adequate social reproduction as her health fails and as her son, sent away to be cared for on the public charity, dies without being returned to her (129; Gates 1987).

Ultimately, Wilson envisions the possibility of a humane, moral society. In a recent article on the “economic identities” in Our Nig, John Ernest concludes that Wilson envisions a society built around a “marketplace economy” which “depends on . . . inevitable conflict,” and that conflict “may contain the terms of mutual dependence, the demands of collective survival.” In his view, that conflict, if entered into by socially equal human beings, provides the basis of “a genuine and morally secure community of interests,” as implicit in the story of Frado’s parents (Ernest 1994, 435). In the final instance, however, Ernest does not believe that Wilson is critiquing early industrial capitalism under formation in the antebellum northern United States. He bases this argument both on Wilson’s conscious effort to avoid reinforcing the anticapitalist arguments delivered by proslave Southern critics of the North who argued that the dialectical synthesis of class struggle was slavery and her efforts to earn a living by entering the marketplace with her own product. She, according to Ernest, is constructing an imaginary of multiple subjectivities in conflict, which, when imbued with authentic Christian principles, would lead to a humane capitalism.

Ernest’s argument seems to locate Wilson’s politics in a remarkable relation to William Cooper’s own sense of the viability of “mutual dependence.” As seen above, “mutual dependence” ideologically obfuscates the expropriative nature of social relations and the racial prejudice and gender inequality articulated in certain relations. Wilson is not defending such an ideological practice under early industrial capitalism; she is dismantling it and revealing its hidden inequality. Similarly to Ernest, Thomas
B. Lovell avers that Wilson’s intent is to show “faith” in “the principles associated” with “the northern economic system.” Basically, he argues that Wilson’s novel as an argument and a product suggests the benefits of participation of individuals as laborers in the capitalist market. He bases this contention on Wilson’s repeated expression of her ability to earn a living, though meager, to enjoy leisure activities provided by limited hours of work, and on the principle that “presumably commits an employer to the terms of a mutually binding contract.” Additionally, free of “slavery’s shadow,” northern capitalism would be beneficial to all (Lowell 1996, 20). Aside from the fact that Frado enjoyed at least the first two of these three “benefits” of labor during her term of service with the Bellmonts, the latter depends on the ability of the labor movement to coerce the employer into such a contract. As was shown with the Pawtucket strike, its causes derived from the arbitrary deviance from the “mutually binding contract”—a perpetual character of capitalism. Further, Mrs. Bellmont’s “trouble” with white domestics implies a collective resistance to the kind of treatment she wished to apply. In both cases, white workers are able to deploy collective resistances that exclude Frado through racialized proscriptions. Frado’s knowledge of these facts contextualized by her distrust of other social relations pointed up in the novel indicates that her resort to entry in the market is on one level a pragmatic gesture and on another based in the knowledge labor’s transformative power.

Elsewhere in his otherwise excellent article, however, Ernest argues that “Wilson deliberately and forcefully conflates the economic situations of working-class whites and culturally enslaved ‘free’ blacks” (1994, 431–32). He could go further and suggest that by dialectically linking her critique of the privilege of whiteness and “true womanhood,” to a deconstruction of the language of republican possession and ownership of whiteness, to an analysis of the hypocrisy of a “free” society that depends on exploited labor, and to the imagination of a society with “mutual dependence” as its foundation, Wilson subverts the tendency toward the fragmentation of social understanding resulting from the logics of capitalism, imperialism, patriarchy, and racism. By connecting
the labor of the individual, her novel, to the social relations that produced it, Wilson links the part to the whole without confusing either. Further, because these logics require a structure of expropriation that could not exist in a liberated, truly “Christian” society, Wilson is striking at the heart of both the marketplace Ernest and Lovell believe she is trying simply to reconfigure and of the racial formation that inflects “free enterprise.” And by dialectically imagining the early industrial American social totality, Wilson is imagining a sort of collective opposition, prefigured in her biological parent’s relationship based on the absolute negation of privilege (Wilson 1983, 12–15) and suggested by her call (in the preface) to her “colored brethren universally for patronage”—a collectivity perhaps fraught with colliding interests, specificities, and experiences, but imbued with a nonexpropriative ideology.

What, then, besides their location within specific historical conditions and their treatment of similar cultural and material themes, do Cooper’s The Pioneers and Wilson’s Our Nig have in common? Both represent a social whole. Cooper’s world is the ideological construction of a patriarchal community delineated by class, articulated by feudal forms of station and “mutual dependence” contained by patriarchy. Wilson’s protagonist encounters a social formation fragmented, but dialectically linked, by social and cultural divisions of labor and antihumanist hierarchies. But as Cooper’s imaginary expanded beyond the text, beyond history receding into a romanticized past, Wilson’s imaginary breaks beyond into the unimaginable future. As Mrs. Hollister and Remarkable Pettibone disrupt Cooper’s text and intentions and portend the emergence of market capitalism with its organization of labor strife, Frado becomes the text and prefigures enormous possibilities on the cusp of the Civil War crisis and the emergence of new freedoms hindered or helped by new struggles over racial liberation and class inequality. Though forgotten by her oppressors, “she will never cease to track them beyond mortal vision” (131).

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NOTES

1. The term *dialectical materialism*, contrary to the advice of Michael Denning (1986, 373, n. 2), has not “been entirely corrupted by Stalinist ideology”—whatever the latter means. It is not clear if Denning wishes to remove this term from circulation because of its relation to Stalinism or because of its relation to Marxism. I am using the term in the Althusserian sense developed in *For Marx* (1999) and *Reading Capital* (1999). Fundamentally, dialectical materialism is the theoretical basis of historical materialism and the terrain on which Marxist theories of opposition, counterhegemony, resistance, and revolution are dialectically formulated. At its heart, as a mode of theoretical production (involving, in its way, its own version of class and racial equality struggles), dialectical materialism can be envisioned as a process and site of connecting apparently disparate and de-linked points of possible alliance in the struggle against imperialism, capitalism, patriarchy, and racism. Readings of these texts are informed by elaborations of Marxist critical theory found in San Juan’s *Hegemony and Strategies of Transgression* (1995), especially chapter 4.

2. See for example, Scheckel 1998; Larson 1997; Ashwill 1994. These authors discuss Cooper’s use of white perceptions of Indians to develop American (white) concepts of national identity, property, and value. Ashwill develops analysis of counterhegemonic writings by Native American writers. See also Alexander Saxton’s reading of Cooper’s opus generally in his *The Rise and Fall of the White Republic: Class Politics and Mass Culture in Nineteenth-Century America* (1990), especially chapter 8.

3. Conroy argues that revolutionary leaders had used the political atmosphere of the taverns to mobilize opposition to England. Understanding this potential for continued democratic politics, revolutionary leaders, including the likes of Samuel Adams, sought to limit the space for such activity. The tavern was a key target. Liquor licensing and the consolidation of alcohol production in the United States limited tavern-keeping to politically dependent people. In some important ways, this process helped to define and demarcate separate gendered spheres.

4. It should be noted that Cooper suggests the formation of this looting party was formed at the Bold Dragoon, the Hollisters’ tavern. Further, textual evidence indicates that Mrs. Hollister led this particular group. At the time of the formation of the militia, Mrs. Hollister was “too busily engaged with certain preparations of her own, to make her comments” on the military preparedness of the militia. And at the mountain, Mrs. Hollister “was followed by 20 curious boys” (Cooper 1968, 597, 605).

5. While Foner (1979) argues that women’s union efforts were thwarted by male hostility, Stansell (1986) nuances this argument a bit by suggesting that male paternalism and class consciousness ameliorated this hostility and helped them sometimes to engender a benevolent cooperative relation with women workers.

6. That Cooper’s message was directed toward elites is further indicated by the price of his novels. At two dollars they were, as Alan Taylor notes, “the equivalent of four days wages” (1995, 419).
7. Mrs. Hollister helps to define the “naturalness” of racial hierarchies by describing her one female employee as “the lazy black baste” and by assuming the dichotomy of “savage” and Christian when speaking of American Indians (Cooper 1968, 200, 204–5).

8. As emerging industrial capitalism created “economies of scale,” huge tracts of lands that formed the material basis of a community with a single family at its head, such as Templeton, were broken up. The feudal society elaborated in The Pioneers could only be reproduced on the scale of a single household. Owners of property came into economic relation with one another and formed a social class based not in aristocratic or familial allegiances but in these economic relations set in motion by the market (Johnson 1978, 15–36).

9. It is important to note that the significant difference in manner by which both Remarkable and Mrs. Hollister expound racial theories implies their own constructions of difference between themselves. Remarkable’s articulations signify a protest against diminished status in racial terms, while Mrs. Hollister simply describes her employee and echoes dominant perceptions of Native Americans’ status as savages, invoking Christian-based ideological reasons for American imperialism (205). While the first is the articulation of a laborer, the latter is the assumption of membership in a social class (through collective identification with her husband and with Templeton’s elites) that directly benefits materially from expansion. Thus, prescriptions are forged here on intergender alliance based in class and articulated in terms of race.

10. It is important to note that the earliest versions of U.S. socialism articulated working-class ideology in common ownership not only of labor but also of the means of production, although this group never held widespread sway in the antebellum labor movement. Some within this tradition also struggled against acceptance of the benefits of whiteness within the labor movement (Saxton 1976, 37–41).

11. According to Hazel V. Carby, it is Wilson’s movement both within and outside of the Abolitionist milieu, her existence in southern conditions in a northern situation, and her critique of domesticity that influenced her decision for “adapting literary conventions to more adequately conform to a narrative representation and re-creation of black experience” (1987, 45). Stern sees Wilson’s central formalistic element as gothic (1995, 440). In contrast to all of the other criticism cited here, for Thomas B. Lovell, it is Wilson’s commitment to the sentimental novel that binds the narrative to producing a “salutary view of wage labor” and a defense of fairly remunerated labor in early industrial capitalism (1996, 24–25).

12. The term redundancy is borrowed, with some variation, from Barbara Foley, who suggests that this technique helps to expose “social forces impelling the protagonist to develop and change” as well as to depict “other characters whose lives intersect with and parallel that of the protagonist” (1993, 331). This is not to elaborate on any relationship that may exist between Wilson and writers of eighty years later; it is simply to provide a definition for a literary device.

13. This silence and absence should not be misread as Mrs. Bellmont’s ultimate dominance of the family, however; Bellmont asserts his patriarchal
authority on the issues of Frado’s education and of his daughter Jane’s marriage (60).

14. Wilson uses the term slavery’s shadow in the full subtitle of the novel.

15. Significantly, this set of relations, in their particularity in the private household and with equally significant differences derived from the particular characteristics imparted to them by the general material conditions of emerging industrial capitalism, resemble James Fenimore Cooper’s imagined feudal hierarchy of post-Revolutionary Templeton. Interestingly, this suggests that the Hollisters historically prefigure the Bellmonts.

16. On the issue of Frado’s mother, Katherine Clay Bassard speaks to the ease with which whites are able to reclaim the benefits afforded to them by institutionalized racism. This is signified by her surrender of Frado to the Bellmonts as a symbolic gesture “tantamount to selling her into slavery” (1997, 192–93).

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History of the Communist Movement: Failure, Betrayal, or Learning Process?

Domenico Losurdo

How should a coherent analysis of the history of the Communist movement in the twentieth century be developed? What must be the primary approach? Today the thesis of the “failure” of “real, existing socialism” is so undisputed that not even the Left opposes it. The current dominant historiography and ideology attempt to wrap up a dramatic century in an enlightening fable along the following lines. At the beginning of the twentieth century, a pretty and virtuous young girl (Miss Democracy) gets attacked first by one brute (Mr. Communism), and then by another one (Mr. Nazi-fascism). By utilizing the differences between the two, and through complicated events, the girl finally frees herself from the horrible situation. Having gained maturity without losing any of her charm, Miss Democracy can finally live out love’s young dream by marrying Mr. Capitalism. In a sea of respect and general admiration, the happy, inseparable couple choose to spend their life principally between New York and Washington, between the White House and Wall Street. In this view, there is no possible doubt: the failure of Communism appears to be as obvious as it is inglorious.

This educational tale, however, has nothing to do with real history. Contemporary democracy is based on the principle that every individual enjoys certain inalienable rights without regard to race, class, or gender. It therefore requires the overthrow of the
three great discriminations (racial, class, and sexual) that were still commonplace on the eve of the October Revolution. Let us look at the first one: it appears in a dualistic form. On a worldwide level, we see the “enslavement of hundreds of millions of working people in Asia, in the colonies in general, and in the small countries” by “a few select nations” which, Lenin continues, claim “the exclusive privilege of forming a state” and deny the barbarians in the colonies or semicolonies that same right (1964a, 424; 1964c, 437). On the other hand, in the United States, one finds racial discrimination, where Blacks, living under a regime of white supremacy, are denied political and civil rights. In 1944, the famous Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myrdal comes to this eloquent conclusion: “Segregation is now becoming so complete that a white Southerner practically never sees a Negro except as his servant and in other standardized and formalized caste situations” (1944, 41).

In the following years, mobilization and agitation among the Blacks begin to show some results. The change in climate can be explained by a letter sent by the U.S. attorney general to the Supreme Court, which was just then debating integration in public schools: “Racial discrimination furthers communist propaganda and raises doubts about the solidity of our democratic creed even among friendly nations.” According to the U.S. historian who cites this letter, Washington is in danger of alienating not only the “Coloreds” in the Far East and the Third World but also inside the United States; Communist propaganda is successful in winning the Blacks for its “revolutionary cause” by destroying their “belief in American institutions” (Woodward 1996, 118, 131–34).

It makes no sense to equate Communism with Nazism, the latter being the force that has consistently and brutally fought against the end of racial discrimination and the introduction of democracy. The Third Reich is the attempt, driven on by total war, to construct a worldwide regime of white supremacy under German and “Aryan” hegemony. The Communist movement, on the other hand, has made decisive contributions to the defeat of racial discrimination and colonialism. If one wants to view the epoch that started with the October Revolution as the period of the crisis
of democracy, one must view the colonial peoples (and others who are excluded from the liberal tradition) as a negligible quantity, which is equal to a recolonization of history.

Let us now turn from the colonies and “immature races” to the capitalist metropolis, the “civilized” people. Lenin states that significant clauses exist here also for exclusion from civil rights and democracy. In England, the election laws are “still sufficiently restricted to exclude the lower stratum of the proletariat proper” (Lenin 1964b, 272, citing a “bourgeois student of ‘British imperialism’”). In addition, we can mention that a few privileged individuals continued to enjoy the “right of multiple votes” until the abolition of this right in 1948. In the classical country of liberal traditions, the process of achieving the principle of “one person, one vote” was particularly complex, and this process is unthinkable without the challenge posed by the revolution in Russia and the Communist movement.

Even where male suffrage was universal or nearly universal, it was still neutralized by the institution of a parliamentary upper house, which remained a privilege of the nobility and advantaged classes. In the Italian senate, the princes of the House of Savoy were seated by law as full members; all others were proposed by the prime minister and appointed by the king for life. Similar situations existed in other European upper houses, which were not elected (with the exception of France), but gained their members through a combination of heredity and royal appointment.

In spite of a number of radical changes which culminated in the Paris Commune, the senate of the Third Republic was, at the beginning of the twentieth century, elected by indirect vote and its composition was heavily weighted in favor of rural areas (and sociopolitical conservatism) to the detriment of Paris and the other large cities. Again the situation in Great Britain is of particular interest. Aside from the House of Lords (hereditary, with the exception of a few bishops and judges), the landed gentry was in firm control of public affairs, a situation only slightly different from Germany and Austria.

In the United States, too, remnants of class discrimination continue to exist, although, as has been mentioned, showing up
mainly in the form of discrimination against Blacks as well as the poorest strata of the population.

In the West as a whole, the most prominent clause of exclusion is that against women. In England, the leaders of the suffragette movement, mother and daughter Pankhurst, were periodically required to spend time in the local jails. Condemned by Lenin and the Bolshevik party, the “exclusion of women” was being abolished by the political right wing in Russia after the February revolution. This revolution was welcomed by Gramsci as a “proletarian revolution” (because of the decisive role of the soviets and the masses); he delightedly points out that it “destroys authoritarianism and replaces it with universal suffrage that includes women.” The Weimar Republic (which emerged from the revolution in Germany one year after the Russian October) follows the same path, and only later, the United States (Losurdo 1998, chap. 2, sec. 3).

The overcoming of the three great discriminations became possible through a dual movement: numerous and great revolutions from below that took place in capitalist large cities as well as in the colonies, often inspired by the October Revolution and the Communist movement; and revolutions from above that were advanced to prevent new revolutions from below.

Democracy as universally understood today also includes economic and social rights. Ironically, the patriarch of neoliberalism, Hayek, complains that their achievement and establishment in the West relied heavily on the “ruinous” influence of the “Russian Marxist revolution.” Of course the subordinate classes did not wait for the year 1917 to demand acknowledgment of those rights. Their achievement accompanied the same steps that led to universal suffrage. Robespierre condemns voting rights based on status as an echo of antique slavery; at the same time he praises the “right to life” as the primary and most inalienable human right. The 1848 revolution, which sanctions the triumph of (male) suffrage, also led to the demand for the right to work: this is the start of the second stage, in which the socialist movement is the protagonist. In Germany, where this is especially strong, Bismarck takes care to preempt a revolution from below with a revolution from above by introducing the first elements of social security. Finally,
the third stage begins with the radical changes in Russia, and stretches through to today. During World War II, Franklin Delano Roosevelt declares that in order to eradicate “the seeds of Hitlerism,” “freedom from want” must be realized, which would mean drastic intervention in existing economic and social conditions. These slogans by the U.S. president seem to signal an undertaking of social democracy that “goes far beyond” previous U.S. political tradition, as Kissinger correctly noted, and, according to Hayek, even points to the infamous Bolshevik revolution (see Losurdo 1998, chap. 2, sec. 3).

Once again, it is impossible to understand the emergence and further development of the Western welfare state without the October Revolution and, more generally, the revolutionary cycle that leads from Jacobinism to Communism. In this case as well, we are dealing with a combination of revolutions from below and from above, with active and passive revolutions. One could say this is par for the course for the processes of historical change; why then speak of “failure” in connection with the events that were set in motion by the October Revolution? To gain a better understanding of the inadequate and misleading character of this concept, let us try to apply it to the former colonies that gained independence and dignity through struggles inspired and nurtured by the Communist movement.

It is widely known that Mao Zedong declared at the foundation of the People’s Republic of China that the Chinese nation had risen up and nobody would tread on it again. Perhaps he was thinking about the years when a sign at the entrance to the French consulate in Shanghai forbade entrance to Chinese and dogs. Is the new situation in the great Asian country a result of “failure”? Similar observations can be made about Vietnam or Cuba, and no less about Third World countries that do not adhere to socialism, but gained independence and dignity in the wake of the challenge posed by the October Revolution, “real, existing socialism,” and the Communist movement against the world capitalist system.

At the very least, the contemporary discourse on “failure” is grossly Eurocentric. However, the opinion is a commonly held one: Hannah Arendt speaks about the “catastrophe” of the
French Revolution. But our world and contemporary democracy are unimaginable without the action and influence exerted first by the French Revolution and later by the October Revolution; as we have noted, the Communist movement is influencing directly or indirectly even the leading nation of the Western camp.

From “failure” to “betrayal”

Even more amazing is the success of the concept of “failure,” even among the Left. Especially in these circles, this tale spread by the ruling ideology and historiography experiences at times a new variant: while pretending to be Mr. Communism, the brute who first attacked Miss Democracy was in reality Mr. Stalinism, a vulgar trickster or, at best, a crude ignoramus who had not grasped even a smidgen of Marxist theory. The debate about “failure” now tends to be replaced by the discourse on “betrayal” (or at best misunderstanding).

It is common knowledge that the motif of the “revolution betrayed” is especially favored by Trotsky. In general, the authors who are influenced by him in one way or another tend to talk about “betrayal” in just about all revolutions. During the course of the French Revolution, too, we have the dismal performance of “political functionaries,” the bureaucrats who smother “direct democracy.” We are dealing with a “mechanism at the end of which direct democracy, self-rule by the people, undergoes a gradual change into an instrument of oppression through the establishment of a revolutionary ‘dictatorship.’” A highly educated and enthusiastic follower of Trotsky states that in both the French and the Russian revolutions the “concentration of power” was justified by citing “necessity.” In reality, this neglected the unfortunate role of “bureaucracy” and “bureaucratic ossification,” which is primarily responsible for the degeneration: “Democracy from below leads to the establishment of a class of upstarts who tend to differentiate themselves from the masses, and who aim to exploit the people’s revolution for their own benefit” (Guerin 1968, 2:468–70, 475–79).

Leaving eighteenth-century France now for twentieth-century Spain, we see that nothing has changed. How to explain the tragedy
in the 1930s that ended in the victory of fascism? For Chomsky there is no doubt: in response to the Franco revolt there arises “a social revolution of unprecedented scope,” whose protagonists are the masses, but then the Stalinist Communist Party acts as a “counterrevolutionary force” that “removed control from the workers to hand power over to the state bureaucracy” (1987, 86, 420).

Let us now move from Europe to Asia. How can one explain the crisis of the Cultural Revolution in China? In this case, the antibureaucratic thrust is clear and obvious, but the “propaganda troops of the workers,” the organizations that were supposed to lead the struggle, unfortunately “transformed themselves” into “a sector of bureaucracy, sometimes in harmony and sometimes in contradiction with other bureaucrats” (Masi 1979, 1038).

With its naive dogmatism (the bureaucrats who smother the élan of the masses and betray the revolution are always on the other side), with its endless monotony and universal applicability to periods of crisis or the process of consolidation and “bureaucratization” of every revolution, the concept of “betrayal” shows its gaping void. The weakness of its argumentation remains: it is necessary, after all, to explain how a “failure”—or a “traitor” or the perpetrator of a colossal misunderstanding—has managed to make such an enormous contribution to the emancipation of the colonial people and, in the West, to the destruction of the old regime and the emergence of the welfare state. In 1923, when Lenin, gravely ill, is forced to release the reins of power, the state that emerged from the October Revolution, mutilated in the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk, is leading a paltry and precarious life. In 1953, at Stalin’s death, the Soviet Union and the socialist camp are enjoying enormous growth, power, and prestige. A few more of these “traitors” and the situation of the imperialist and capitalist world system would have become precarious and untenable indeed!

“Betrayal” from Stalin to Khrushchev

During the years immediately following the downfall of the Third Reich, the prestige of the Soviet Union is so great that it is noted even outside of the Communist movement. Hannah Arendt,
far from comparing the country that emerged from the October Revolution with the Third Reich, as she will be doing later, credits the Soviet Union with having developed an “entirely new and successful approach to nationality conflicts, its new form of organizing different peoples on the basis of national equality”; this problem is “what every political and national movement in our times should give its utmost attention to” (1978, 149; emphasis added). The italics emphasize the reversal of Arendt’s position a few years later, after the beginning of the Cold War, when she accuses Stalin of deliberately dissolving existing organizations to create artificially the amorphous mass that provides the basis for totalitarianism.

During the years following the downfall of the Third Reich, the USSR’s prestige is also enjoyed by its leadership. Alcide de Gasperi, leader of the Italian Christian Democrats and later prime minister, praises in July 1944 “the untold historical and lasting merit of the army organized by Josef Stalin.” The latter’s achievements are not limited to military ones:

There is something extremely simpatico, extremely suggestive in this universalistic tendency of Russian communism. When I look at Hitler and Mussolini, who have persecuted people because of their race and came up with the well known, terrifying anti-Jewish legislation, and when I then look at the Russians, who consist of 160 races and are tackling the fusion of all these races by overcoming the differences between Europe and Asia, this attempt, this effort to unite mankind, I must say: this is Christian, this is most universalistic in the spirit of Catholicism.

Although de Gasperi stresses the sacrifice of human life, he is on the whole positive about the “great economic undertaking” of collectivization of agriculture and industry that became necessary because of “the threat clearly shown in Mein Kampf.” Regarding the Moscow trials, the leader of the Christian Democrats underscores the credibility of the charges, citing “objective American sources” (1956, 15–17).

In 1953, immediately after Stalin’s death, one of his enemies, a follower of Trotsky, makes this indicative historical analysis:
In the course of three decades, however, the face of the Soviet Union has become transformed. The core of Stalin’s historic achievements consists in this, that he had found Russia working with wooden ploughs and is leaving her equipped with atomic piles. He has raised Russia to the level of the second industrial Power of the world. This was not a matter of mere material progress and organization. No such achievement would have been possible without a vast cultural revolution, in the course of which a whole nation was sent to school to undergo a most intensive education. (Deutscher 1966, 184–85)

Although conditioned and partially distorted by the Asiatic and despotic heritage of czarist Russia, in Stalinism “the Socialist ideal had its inner integrity and consistency” (184). Three years later, in the wake of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, the picture had totally changed. Deutscher credits Khrushchev with finally denouncing “the huge, grim, whimsical, morbid, human monster” to which Communists had “lain prostrate over a quarter of a century” (7). Without a doubt there were two turning points that have determined the contemporary view of Stalin: the outbreak of the Cold War in 1947 and the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. After 1956, the campaign against Stalin not only incorporates the basic themes of the Western campaign against the USSR as a whole, sometimes it adds something to it; for example, Deutscher, in 1965, criticizes sharply the “wartime tide of pro-Stalinism [that] ran high in allied countries, especially in the United States” (1966, 223)! On this basis, a truly grotesque trial against Stalin develops. Citing the Khrushchev report, Deutscher describes Stalin as a traitor (of the “socialist ideal”), who was not only repulsive, but politically inept; he had led the war effort by “tracing front-lines and lines of offensives on a globe on his desk” (6)! How was it possible that the Soviet Union, led by such a ridiculous figure of a “generalissimo,” was able to defeat the gargantuan war machine that had beaten the French general staff within days, the same generals who had been victorious in the First World War? Together with the whole history of Communism, this caricature of Stalin distorts one of the most tragic but also one of the most beautiful
aspects of world history, which is inextricably linked with the
name Stalingrad, and makes it impossible to understand.

It seems reasonable for Communists who are trying to
respond to the anti-Communist campaign to lament: *In principio
erat Khrushchev!* [In the beginning was Khrushchev!] In the final
analysis, he paved the way for the anti-Communist campaign and
for this reason is being branded as the originator of the ruinous
developments that culminated in the collapse of the Soviet Union.
He is seen as the one who, although shaped in the Communist
Party and its tradition, frittered away its enormous political and
intellectual wealth. In conclusion: the prosecutor in the trial
against Stalin for “betrayal of socialism” is now forced to sit in
the dock himself.

*Expansion and beginning of
crisis in the “socialist camp”*

If the polemic against Stalin and his “betrayal” cannot begin
to explain the gigantic process of emancipation on a worldwide
level during the years this “traitor” was in power, then the charge
of “betrayal” against Khrushchev cannot explain the dramatic
controversies in the CPSU prior to the Twentieth Congress. A few
months after Stalin’s death, Beria becomes isolated and is liqui-
dated by a majority that includes, besides Khrushchev, Stalin’s
closest collaborators. Against whom should the charges be direct-
ed in this case? Another point to ponder is the method of Beria’s
liquidation: it is a Mafia-style reckoning, a brutal act that makes
no reference either to law or the Party constitution.

And even before 1953 or 1956, another grave problem erodes
the “socialist camp” from within. Even though it has experienced
impressive expansion, it shows significant rifts, primarily the
break between the Soviet Union and Tito’s Yugoslavia. This is
only the first, unexpected national crisis of the “socialist camp.”
More are to come: the invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia,
the Ussuri River confrontations on the Soviet-Chinese border, the
wars between Vietnam and Cambodia and between Vietnam and
China. Of course, in these cases as well, one can open the hunt
for a “traitor.” But moving from one crisis to the next, this hunt
becomes more labored and confusing. Who is the “traitor” in the
clashes between Vietnam and Cambodia and between Vietnam and China? And what is the point in trying to transform the history of the “socialist camp” into an unbroken line of “betrayals,” where responsibility is shared even by protagonists of great liberation struggles? Such an analysis can only serve to drag decades of history through the mud, while claiming to try to defend them.

Another approach may be more productive. In particular the extraordinary expansion of the “socialist camp” produces a brand new problem: how should relations between the different countries, large and small, in this camp develop? And how can unity in the fight against imperialism be combined with the preservation of national sovereignty? This problem becomes more acute after the victorious revolution in China and the entry into the “socialist camp” of a country that is also a continent, and that feels it should play, because of its size alone, a predominant role in the international sphere.

The talks between Stalin and Mao Zedong shortly thereafter in Moscow are so tense they nearly lead to a break. Considering the conflict that became the hallmark of the Cold War, Stalin had managed to expand the political and military presence of the Soviet Union into Asia and even China. His conference partners in Yalta had confirmed acknowledgment of the independence of Outer Mongolia, which had been stolen from China by czarist Russia and the “white” generals, and which the Soviet Union, even in 1924, had acknowledged as an “integral component” of China. In Yalta, Stalin had also achieved the “internationalization of the trading port of Dalian, with preservation of predominant Soviet interests in this port, and the reestablishment of the lease of Port Arthur as a military base and naval port of the USSR,” as well as “mutual utilization of the eastern Chinese railroad and the railroad of southern Manchuria.” Under pressure from the United States and Great Britain, Chiang Kai-shek finally agreed to these significant concessions to Stalin, and signed a treaty with the Soviet Union that—not without justification—has been called China’s last “unequal treaty” (Kindermann 2001, 303). Mao Zedong will be the one to reopen this treaty.

The Chinese delegation touches on the problem of Outer Mongolia only with the greatest caution. Mao immediately backs
down on this question, but as far as the fastest possible recovery of Chinese railroads and ports is concerned, he is adamant. In this case, Stalin has to give in, but he only does so when he learns of talks about starting diplomatic relations between Beijing and London. He sees this as a sign of Chinese Titoism (Shen Zhihua 2002).

Relations between the two great socialist countries were difficult from the very beginning. Both engage in anti-imperialist struggle. But in the case of the Soviet Union this fight consists of resisting Washington’s policy of rollback, and of consolidating the results of the Yalta conference (that Stalin hotly defended during his talks with Mao). On the other hand, anti-imperialist resistance for the People’s Republic of China means regaining its territorial integrity, full sovereignty over eastern Manchuria, and eliminating the concessions and privileges won by Stalin from his partners in Yalta and from Chiang Kai-shek. Severely weakened by the war (which was worsened by the nerve-racking slowness of the United States and Great Britain to open the second front in Europe), and threatened by new aggression, the USSR desperately needs to catch its breath and to unite as broad and as compact a front as possible around itself.

In China, the situation is different. The takeover of power by the Communists has not completed the process of national reunification. The reclamation of Taiwan is on the agenda, beginning with the two little islands of Quemoy and Matsu. In his desperate attempt to mobilize the U.S. administration, Churchill underlines that these islands lie “off-shore,” and they “are legally part of China,” whose “obvious national and military purpose [is], namely, to get rid of a bridgehead admirably suited to the invasion of mainland of China” (Boyle 1990, 193). Mao’s determination to pursue this goal without being intimidated by the U.S. nuclear threat is understandable. The Soviet leadership views his effort as a sign of nationalist and provincial tendencies, while coming under suspicion themselves of turning a deaf ear to aspirations of emancipation and liberation of the colonial or former colonial peoples, whether for egotistical or opportunist reasons. If, in the wake of repeated nuclear threats by the United States, China tends to double its efforts to join the nuclear club, the Soviet Union
views this policy as furthering the deployment of nuclear arms in countries such as Germany, which would endanger the “peaceful coexistence” the Soviet Union so desperately needs.

The differences, primarily a result of objective conditions, trigger an increasingly fierce ideological (and diplomatic) collision course. Criticism of the Chinese leadership for provincial short-sightedness and adventurism escalates rapidly. At the height of this attack, the leadership is being accused of fanning a potential Soviet-American nuclear catastrophe in order finally to rule the world through the strength of its demographic potential. On the other side, a similar escalation is taking place: far from being simple “opportunists” in the fight against imperialism, Soviet leaders are transformed into imperialists themselves, and even into the most insidious and dangerous imperialists, who have taken on the legacy of insatiable czarist expansionism, and who now, as the new czars, directly threaten the People’s Republic of China, the center of the struggle of colonial and former colonial peoples. Moscow and Beijing exchange accusations of “betrayal” and resulting excommunication. But both parties, far from being traitors, are, at best, too “orthodox” in their Marxism. They mechanically presume the disappearance of national conflicts in socialism; and because these conflicts continue to exist, they must be accounted for by one or the other’s “betrayal.”

In conclusion, if on the one hand the “socialist camp” at Stalin’s death had experienced its greatest expansion, it already showed, on the other hand, two worrisome rifts. Two unresolved problems are the systematic succession in the leadership and the relations among the different socialist countries. The failure to solve the first problem led to brutal and primitive use of force within Communist parties; the second unsolved problem led to the dissolution of the socialist camp through a number of trials of strength, invasions, military occupations, and open wars.

**Between utopianism and exceptional circumstances**

The picture is not exactly an appealing one. It is therefore understandable that some elements on the Left would like to liquidate the history that began with the October Revolution. They do not, of course, present Western capitalism and liberalism as an
alternative; instead they pursue utopianism. This course of action risks recommending as a cure that which has often contributed to the exacerbation of the evil. Let us look at the dialectics following the Bolshevik Revolution: the first world war was still raging; the slaughter and abolition of basic freedoms in the name of “exceptional circumstances,” even in the countries with the most solid liberal traditions, make any political program appear inadequate that continues to demand a state without a military or state apparatus or any form of coercion. Marxism is flattened into anarchism and presents itself, in a sense, as a religion. The young Bloch expects from the Soviets the “transformation of power into love” (Losurdo 2000, chap. 2, sec. 10). Much the same argument is heard from exponents of the revolutionary socialist party in Soviet Russia, when they declare “law is the opium of the people” (Bloch 1961, 256–59), and “a constitution was a bourgeois conception” (Carr 1950, 128). With this as one’s basis, it would not only be easy to justify terrorist measures during emergencies, but also extremely difficult or impossible to make a transition to constitutional normalcy, especially since this is branded as “bourgeois” from the start. In this manner, exceptional circumstances benefit utopianism, and utopianism makes exceptional circumstances more extreme.

Patriotic fanaticism and national hatred, in part spontaneous and in part skillfully stirred up, have led to slaughter in imperialist war. The need is urgent to begin a brand new chapter of history. And here appears in certain sections of the Communist movement an unrealistic internationalism with the tendency to brush off the different national identities as pure prejudice. This kind of “universalism” is not able to respect special qualities and differences. It creates conflicts and sharpens the national question, at first within the Soviet Union and later in the relations between the different socialist countries. Again we have the disastrous spiral: exceptional circumstances—abstract utopianism—more extreme exceptional circumstances.

The awareness of the role played by capitalist interests in the unleashing of the slaughter makes not only capitalism, but money, a hateful object in the eyes of more sensitive souls. The
young Bloch calls upon the Soviets to put an end not only to all “private economy” but also to “money economy” and with it the “merchant morals that praise the evilest aspects of human nature” (Losurdo 2000, chap. 2, sec. 10). With regard to Russia, the catastrophe of World War I and the civil war cause the collapse of currency, which in some areas is replaced by the barter system. This exceptional situation is being interpreted as “communism,” even if only as “war communism.” Even a drastic emergency measure like the seizure by the Soviet authorities of hoarded surplus produce from farmers is presented as being an advance of communism. The messianic expectation of the withering of the state, national identities, and money—meaning the emphatic and abstract utopian dream—culminates in all three cases in the tendency to transfigure phenomena (the lack of a precise constitutional framework, national oppression, insufficient development of the national market) into anticipation of the future postcapitalism, even though these phenomena are actually expressions of the continued existence of the old regime.

**Revolution and the learning process**

The emergence of emphatic and abstract utopianism is nevertheless not the product of the imaginations of individual thinkers or personalities, but the result of objective historical processes. Engels gives us a helpful hint in his analysis of the English and French revolutions: “In order to secure even those conquests of the bourgeoisie that were ripe for gathering at the time, the revolution had to be carried considerably further. . . . This seems, in fact, to be one of the laws of evolution of bourgeois society (1990, 291–92). There is no reason to disavow the revolution that was inspired by the materialist methodology developed by Marx and Engels. In the final analysis, every revolution tends to present itself as the last one, even as the resolution of all contradictions and, in this way, as the end of history. Utopianism, on the one hand, inspires the enthusiasm of the masses, which is necessary to break the stubborn resistance of the old regime; on the other hand, it makes the building of the new society more difficult. It takes a labored and often contradictory learning process for a great revolution to define precisely
its goals and realizable political forms. As Gramsci pointed out, a revolution is not complete with the taking of power; the invention or establishment of institutional, judicial mechanisms of regular and orderly exercise of power is essential. For this reason, the bourgeois revolution in France spans the time from 1789 to 1871. During all these decades, the new ruling class proceeds through trial and error, contradiction and struggle, as it experiments with different political systems: constitutional monarchy and republic, Jacobin and military dictatorship, empire and Bonapartist regime, representative one-house and two-house systems, different forms of class-based electoral systems (at times tempted to introduce multiple votes for the “most intelligent” or the richest), and direct universal (male) suffrage. In regard to the real social conditions, an initial phase of outlawing of workers’ organizations is followed by a more mature phase with legal acknowledgment of trade unions. Similar developments can be observed in the organization of the military and ideological apparatus and other sectors of public and social life. But it was only with the annihilation of the Paris Commune and the establishment of the Third Republic, with a representative electoral system that included a number of parties while consolidating control in the hands of the ruling class, that the French bourgeoisie found the political and social forms for its exercise of power under normal conditions; the military withdrew a little but remained ready to intervene directly in exceptional circumstances. These political and social forms are not developed at the drawing board, but through difficult struggles against the old regime as well as against the masses, and include international conflicts.

The class or social bloc that is planning to take over from the bourgeoisie is facing an even more difficult task. It must not only “invent” a new political system, but also new social conditions that do not yet exist, unlike the old bourgeois social conditions that were developing already in the previous society; these new conditions can only be developed after the taking of power. As Lenin points out, this is the fundamental difference between “socialist revolution” and “bourgeois revolution” (1965b, 89–90). The learning process required by an anticapitalist movement is far more complex. This task was made more difficult by imperialist
policies of containment, encirclement, and aggression, and the failure to complete it has led to the defeat of socialism.

**Learning process and de-messianization of the communist project**

The socialist and communist movement is far from having completed this process. Should we understand postcapitalist society as the disappearance not only of class contradictions, but of the state, political power and legislative norms, religion, nations, division of labor, the market—of all sources of conflict? Should we continue to believe (as Bebel did) that there is no room in a communist society for “parliaments,” tax and customs administration, “courts,” “attorneys,” “jails,” legal norms, crime, and even “hatred” and “revenge,” and that “tens of thousands of laws and edicts will be turned into wastepaper” (1964, 482–83)?

Should we continue to believe with Trotsky in *The Revolution Betrayed* that in communism “money” and every form of the market will disappear (1937, 65)?

Judging from certain explanations by Trotsky, miraculous transformations are occurring already in socialism: “The genuinely socialist family, from which society will remove the daily vexation of unbearable and humiliating cares, will have no need of any regimentation, and the very idea of laws about abortion and divorce will sound no better within its walls than the recollection of houses of prostitution or human sacrifices” (144–45).

We have already mentioned the ruinous results of the dialectic: exceptional circumstances—abstract utopianism—more extreme exceptional circumstances. One should consider the lessons of Gramsci, who has tried—possibly more than all others—to free the communist project from its messianic aura. By questioning the myth of the withering of the state and its merging into civil society, he pointed out that this civil society is also a type of state; furthermore he stated that internationalism has nothing to do with the failure to appreciate national characteristics and identities that will continue to exist past the downfall of capitalism. Regarding the market, Gramsci says it is better to talk about a “specific market” rather than market in an abstract sense.
Aside from the teachings by one or another significant author, it is most important to analyze the learning process of the Communist movement as such. During World War I, Lenin asserts and radicalizes the thesis of the withering of the state, but in his final years he poses the challenge of building a “truly new” state apparatus, “really worthy of the name of Soviet, socialist, and so on,” and is prepared to learn from “the best West-European standards” (Lenin 1965a, 487–90; Losurdo 2000, chap. 3, sec. 3). During the Khrushchev years, a jurist is brave enough to reinterpret the thesis of the withering of the state, by differentiating between “oppressive functions,” which are destined to diminish and to disappear, and “economic and cultural functions,” which will be further developed. Bloch is critical of this new interpretation. He too has abandoned the messianic expectation of the transformation of “power” into “love.” Although he continues to discuss the thesis of the withering of the state, he now considers it a “borderline ideal” or “marginal concept” (1961, 256–59), meaning an ideal that serves to focus the action without ever becoming reality.

The learning process in other areas is just as labored. Immediately following the October Revolution, Rosa Luxemburg demands that the new regime “crush separatist ambitions with an iron fist,” ambitions that would be instigated by “people without history,” from “moldering corpses . . . that would arise from centuries-old graves” (cited in Losurdo 2000, chap. 5, sec. 2). The struggle between capitalism and socialism with its new social regime makes national demands and contradictions appear obsolete, misleading, and unbearable. The advancing revolution seems to want to put out with the garbage all national and state identities as well as traditional kinds of relations between states. Trotsky, on assuming the position of People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, says, “I will issue a few revolutionary proclamations to the people of the world and then shut up shop” (cited in Carr 1951–53, 3:16). Even though Lenin usually does not use emphatic expressions, he declares in his address to the First Congress of the Communist International, when capitalism seemed in a downward spiral, “The victory of the world communist revolution is assured. . . . [All will] see the founding of the World Federative Republic of
In contrast, Stalin is compelled ten years later to comment on “the colossal stability of nations” (1971, 11: 308). Furthermore, he adds later, language is not just a part of the superstructure, as proven by its stubborn preservation from one regime to the next; socialism does not mean the disappearance of different languages and national identities. And yet, after sharply condemning Trotsky’s theory of the export of the revolution for so many years, Stalin seems to adopt this theory at the end of World War II. In a discussion with Djilas he states, “This war is not as in the past; whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise” (Djilas 1962, 114). The question that has been suppressed here will raise its head forcefully only a few years later: the crisis destined to lead to the dissolution of the “socialist camp” will begin in Eastern Europe.

Let us look at the contradictions arising with the building of a new social order to replace capitalism. We have mentioned previously that the young Bloch wanted to get rid of “money economy” as such. This is not only the position of a philosopher who is inspired by “the spirit of utopianism.” In the 1940s, a Bolshevik effectively describes the moral climate during the first years after the October Revolution: “We young Communists had all grown up in the belief that money was done away with once and for all. . . . If money was reappearing, wouldn’t rich people reappear too? Weren’t we on the slippery slope that led back to capitalism?” (Figes 1996, 771).

But let us put these more or less messianic expectations aside. After gaining power, the Communists have to make difficult, sometimes dramatic decisions: should they first of all try to broaden and consolidate their basis for social consensus, or should they immediately begin their program of integral collectivization of the means of production? This latter thesis was promoted by Rosa Luxemburg, who was highly critical of the Bolsheviks’ “petty-bourgeois” agrarian reforms that let the peasants have their own land (Losurdo 2000, chap. 5, sec. 2). Russia had come out of the war completely impoverished. Was it the primary goal of Soviet power to divide the sparse available resources, or should the thrust go toward
increasing them? If the primary task is development of the forces of production, another dilemma arises: should one create material incentives, or should one appeal to revolutionary consciousness and dedication to the cause of socialism by the “new man”? Mao Zedong harbored the illusion for many years that the gap with the developed capitalist countries could be closed by appealing to revolutionary mass enthusiasm. But the mediocrity of their results and at the same time the consolidation of capitalism led the Chinese Communists to embrace the previous “revisionist” route with great fervor. And thus arose the “socialist market economy.”

Again the learning process proves to be difficult, and not only for those in government. As Gramsci welcomed the October Revolution, he pointed out that at first it would only create “collectivism of poverty and suffering.” At this point he appears to have seen the primary task of the Soviet power to distribute available resources in egalitarian fashion. Later the Italian Communist leader defended the New Economic Policy (NEP) and pointed out that only from a simplistic and superficial point of view of the process of building a postcapitalist society could one be scandalized by the “fur-clad NEP-man” with a decidedly higher standard of living than the workers, although they are the ruling political class. Contrary to what he said before, he seems to see the primary task of the new Soviet power as the development of the productive forces (Losurdo 2000, chap 5, sec. 3).

De-demonization of Stalin (and Khrushchev) and de-canonization of Marx, Engels, and the “classics”

The history of socialism is also the history of these dilemmas, these struggles. Not only did the conflicts leave deep marks on the history of the different Communist parties (in government or opposition) and the entire Communist movement, but also on the development of the general orientation of the great Communist intellectuals. The usual elimination of the real history of socialism in the name of utopianism or the “authentic” thoughts of Marx and Engels also implies the increase in value of specific intellectuals or politicians who stood at the margins of power or only participated marginally, in juxtaposition to those who have assumed responsibilities of government. But this black-and-white image
is not very convincing for a number of reasons: a) it compares apples and oranges, i.e., intentions and actions (Hegel accuses the “beautiful soul” of this position); b) it has no credibility on an international level: the great thinkers or politicians who stayed apart from power are not immune to the naïve illusions, mistakes, and even brutalities of those who were holding the reins of power; c) when one compares the excellent intentions with the mediocre or worse real actions, this attempt again paved the way for the pseudoexplanation of “betrayal.” In his day, Engels made fun of the “superstition which attributed revolutions to the ill-will of a few agitators” (1979, 5). Unfortunately, the Communist movement was—and is—plagued by the superstition that ascribes crisis points or defeat of a revolution to the “ill-will” of a few traitors. It is time to put an end to this lamentable tradition.

In whatever way it is put, the concept of “betrayal” requires the canonization of Marx and Engels (and the “classics” of any given definition), as well as the excommunication of those accused of having betrayed the creed. The concept of “learning process” that has been encouraged here implies the de-demonization of Stalin (as well as Khrushchev and Trotsky) and the de-canonization of Marx, Engels, and the “classics.” This de-canonization itself implies that the learning process is far from complete.

**Capitalism and socialism: Experiments on the drawing board or mutual struggle and conditioning**

If it is absurd to reduce the twentieth century to the enlightening tale mentioned at the beginning of this essay, it is no less ludicrous to present the history of this century as a comparison of two experiments on the drawing board, which led to success for one and failure for the other. Just as the history of the West and the Third World (the overcoming of the three great discriminations and the rise of the welfare state) cannot be understood without the challenge posed by “real, existing socialism,” the history of “real, existing socialism” cannot be understood without the politics of intervention, encircling, and technical and economic embargo by the West.

As far as the first point is concerned, we know that authors who are above any suspicion have drawn connections between
the dismantling of the racial segregation state in the southern United States and the influence of the “Russian Marxist revolution” as well as the “socialist camp.” Here it is important to analyze in greater detail the dialectic that developed after the October Revolution. The capitalist system had consolidated itself by taking on elements from the ideological and political baggage of the Communist and workers’ movement and from the reality of real, existing socialism; it was then able to exert an irresistible attraction on the peoples of those countries that featured a socialism that, from its beginning, carried the easily visible stigmata of the war unleashed and forced upon it by the West. Over time it ossified more and more until it turned into its own caricature. In other words, the countries that were created in the wake of the Bolshevik revolution were unable to measure themselves against the West, even though they contributed to its extensive modification. Finally, the system has emerged victorious that was able to respond better to the challenge posed by its opposite. In this case the initial partial victory of the Communist and workers’ movement, when it showed that it was capable of asserting its concrete historical effects even in the enemy camp, has turned into its opposite, a defeat of strategic consequences.

This contributes to the understanding of the contradictory processes of today. After the loosening of the permanent exceptional circumstances forced upon them by imperialism, and on the basis of a learning process, which is made easier because of the new situation, the meaning of rule of law is maturing in a country like China, and efforts toward the construction of a socialist constitutional state are being made. Today’s constitution and leadership of the People’s Republic of China express this as they are breaking with the tradition of “real, existing socialism” and the legacy of the “Cultural Revolution.” In the West, on the other hand, the disappearance of the challenge posed by a strong international Communist movement and the “socialist camp” has led to a general process of involution. This means not only the deconstruction of the welfare state. The tendency is toward the return, albeit in different form, of two of the three great discriminations that had been overcome in the twentieth century. A leading liberal historian
like Arthur Schlesinger Jr. points out that in the United States the importance of money in election battles is so great that representative bodies are in danger of becoming once again the monopoly of propertied classes (as in the golden years of class-based electoral laws). Regarding international relations, Popper, the almost-official theoretician of “open society,” is explicitly rehabilitating colonialism (Losurdo 1993, chap. 8, secs. 4 and 7). A new vitality has been injected into the old imperial myth of the “chosen people” who have the right and the duty to lead the others: Kipling’s motif of the “white man’s burden” has been replaced by the motif favored by Bush Jr. of the “American man’s burden.”

A “defeat” is not a “failure”: while the latter concept denotes a completely negative conclusion, the former is partially negative; it makes reference to a specific historical context and refuses to suppress the reality of a few countries (including one country that is also a continent) that continue to refer to socialism. Their opposition and vitality stem from the ability to advance the necessary learning process, through errors and more or less successful experiments, by freeing the socialist project from its abstract utopian components. They are rediscovering the socialist market, the socialist version of rule of law, the continuation of national differences and identities. A new phase is opening with many unpredictable aspects: the learning process cannot guarantee success; it is not immune to contradictions and conflict nor to the danger of defeat. It is a process that is far from complete.

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**NOTES**

1 Quotations from French and Italian sources were originally translated into German by the author.

3. See the text of the Yalta agreements in Clemens 1975, 375–76.

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Big Brother Is Looking at You, Kid: InfoTech and Weapons of Mass Repression. Part 1

Herman and Julia Schwendinger

Now George has fallen and Fred is dead
And John got lost in the shooting.
Blood, however, is still blood-red
And the army is again recruiting.
―Song of the Three Soldiers
Bertolt Brecht 1927

Introduction

This essay was almost completed on 5 November 2002, the day Republicans won control of Congress. Control cleared the way for the 19 November passage of a Homeland Security Bill that restricts access to government files under the Freedom of Information Act and gives the police new Internet wiretap powers.
In addition, it forces Internet providers to supply the government with details about their customers, including their e-mails, without a warrant. With this last measure, the FBI will finally obtain the identities of political dissidents from Internet providers that it failed to get because of constitutional restrictions during the Quebec antiglobalization protests five months before Sept. 11. (More on this later.)

Yet the new attacks on civil liberties have not ended with the Homeland Bill’s passage. A week earlier, libertarians began to criticize a program under development at the Pentagon that will lead to an invasion of personal privacy on a gigantic scale. Known as “Total Information Awareness,” this project will attempt to break new ground by networking computers to collect and “mine” all electronically recorded information, including credit card purchases, e-mail messages, academic grades, magazine subscriptions, bank deposits, personal investments, websites, and travel, telephone, social security, income tax, library, and medical records. Alarmingly, as William Safire observes,

To this computerized dossier on your private life from commercial sources, add every piece of information that government has about you—passport application, driver’s license and bridge toll records, judicial and divorce records, complaints from nosy neighbors to the F.B.I., your lifetime paper trail plus the latest hidden camera surveillance—and you have the supersnoop’s dream: a “Total Information Awareness” about every U.S. citizen.²

Ironically, although better known for erasing thousands of e-mail messages to cover his crimes,³ John Poindexter, a retired rear admiral, heads this program. Poindexter, as Ronald Reagan’s national security adviser, helped plan the sale of arms to Iran and illegally divert the proceeds to the contra terrorists in Nicaragua. He was indicted for defrauding the U.S. government in the Iran-Contra affair and was convicted of five felonies, including lying to Congress, obstruction of justice, and destroying official documents.⁴ A New York Times editorial entitled “A Snooper’s Dream” declared that Poindexter never expressed remorse even though he was convicted.⁵ He asserted it was his duty to withhold
information from the American people. Given these and other new developments, we modified our essay. However, if anything, the election outcome has escalated the incipient fascism reported here.  

On the anniversary of Al Qaeda’s criminal attacks, while the nation mourned its dead, President George W. Bush called for the renewal of his “endless war against terrorism.” Bombing Iraq, crushing its army, and killing the Beast of Baghdad, he confidently declared, would be a preemptive strike for peace. It would exterminate a diabolical dictator whose weapons of mass destruction endangered the world’s greatest military power. But did Sadam Hussein, in the fall of 2002, actually possess weapons of mass destruction? The UN’s former coordinator in Iraq and former UN under-secretary general, Count Hans von Sponeck, and the UN’s former chief weapons inspector, Scott Ritter, have said the United States is lying about Iraq’s weapons program. Ritter insists the previous inspection program destroyed most of Iraq’s mass-destuction weapons and he doubts that Saddam could have rebuilt his stocks this soon. Other notables, such as Ramsey Clark, former U.S. attorney general, observed that the Gulf War, incessant U.S. air attacks, and the ten-year embargo have weakened Iraq’s military forces, battered its economy, and killed a million people. Consequently, even though Iraq may not be completely disarmed, Clark believes Saddam Hussein could not pose a realistic threat to the United States.

Extraordinary efforts to justify an invasion have not silenced the critics. On 5 February 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the Security Council. He tried to provide evidence that Iraq posed an immediate threat because it had violated the UN 1991 Security Council Resolutions. In an evaluation of these accusations, however, Dr. Glen Rangwala, a University of Cambridge analyst and lecturer, found reports by UN inspectors that sharply contradicted Powell. In addition, a British government report of “new intelligence material,” issued two days earlier and praised by Powell, turned into an acute embarrassment because it consisted of plagiarized material copied from published academic articles, some several years old.
So, who is telling the truth? Bush and Powell, or Sponeck, Ritter, Clark, and Rangwala? Someone is lying. And, because of what it foreshadows, it is a Big Lie—like that uttered by Hermann Goering, the Prussian Minister of the Interior, when a Nazi squad secretly fired the Reichstag to justify the annihilation of Communists, Social Democrats, and labor leaders. His goals? A fascist dictatorship and a new world order.

We believe Bush is telling the lie in order to carry out the biggest oil and power grab in modern history. But this lie is not merely instigated by imperial aims. Bush’s naked exploitation of popular fears over an “endless war against terrorism,” “weapons of mass destruction,” and an “axis of evil” has led to the greatest plundering of public revenues in the history of our country. This looting represents a class war for which ordinary Americans—our children and grandchildren—will pay dearly in the decades to come.

Furthermore, if we are right about the government’s hidden agenda, there are other “weapons” the American public should be equally concerned about today, and they are weapons of mass repression. These weapons will eventually be turned on those with the courage to speak out and take to the streets to stop an American putsch to reorder the world.

**Weapons of mass repression**

*The Third Reich*

This essay deals with the impact of information technology on weapons of mass repression. To appreciate the significance of this technology, we must relate how it helped the German fascists identify, imprison, and slaughter millions of Jews, Gypsies, homosexuals, Jehovah’s Witnesses and other pacifists, physically and mentally handicapped individuals, Communists, Social Democrats, anarchists, and labor leaders.

During the 1930s and 1940s, the technology was dependent on primitive but powerful automatic data-processing equipment—raw data key-punched on cards and sorted and collated with machines originally developed in the United States by International Business Machines (IBM) for census tabulations and
corporate purposes. In Germany, the IBM subsidiary, Deutsche Hollerith Maschinen Gesellschaft (Dehomag) served the Nazi regime’s census bureau, armed forces, factories, railroads, concentration camps, etc.12 According to Edwin Black, the author of *IBM and the Holocaust*, IBM U.S.A. maintained Dehomag during the 1930s.13 During the war, it provided additional support through subsidiaries in neutral countries.

Following the trail of IBM memos and files from the FBI, State Department, American military, and German government, Black discovered that IBM data-processing equipment made a dramatic difference in the numbers of Jews whose property the Gestapo seized and who were either killed outright or sent to their deaths—starved, gassed, and worked to death as slave labor in factories and concentration camps. In Holland, for example, IBM equipment helped the Germans create a diabolically efficient killing machine. Jewish quotas were established with the aid of
the data processing equipment and the overwhelming majority of Jews in that country were rapidly identified, rounded up, and sent to death camps. In France, however, this technology was sabotaged. The Germans had appointed René Carmille administrator of the French statistical service. The Germans did not know that Carmille was a leader in the underground resistance movement. He sabotaged the German attempt to develop a database comparable to Holland’s and instead used its files for the resistance, generating databases identifying people whose occupational skills and military backgrounds enhanced the struggle against the German forces. His work, for instance, enabled the Free French to mobilize the resistance against the Germans in Algeria virtually overnight.

At the cost of his own life, Carmille saved the lives of tens of thousands of Jews in France. When the Gestapo finally discovered that his department had defied their directives—its employees, while updating the French census records, had not punched the “racial” identities of individuals on Hollerith cards nor collated, tabulated, or printed this information—he was arrested, tortured by Klaus Barbie, the infamous Butcher of Lyon, and sent to Dachau, where he perished.

Information technology in Holland enabled the Nazis to exceed their Jewish quotas; in France, however, they did not fulfill their quotas because sabotage of this technology forced them to conduct haphazard and random roundups. Black reports:

- Of an estimated 140,000 Dutch Jews, more than 107,000 were deported [to concentration camps], and of those 102,000 were murdered—a death ratio of approximately 73 percent [of the Dutch Jews].
- Of an estimated 300,000 to 350,000 Jews living in France, both zones, about 85,000 were deported—of these barely 3,000 survived. The death ratio [of the French Jews] was approximately 25 percent.15

It is important to note that the U.S. government and the people who settled our country can match the deadliest weapon employed by the German fascists. In the nineteenth century, the American
army launched genocidal attacks against Native Americans. Such attacks were also repeatedly conducted by civilian organizations, in hunts organized and financed by groups of white settlers who killed and scalped Native Americans regardless of their age or gender.¹⁶

But there were historical differences. These genocidal attacks involved the extermination of native people who, with some exceptions, could not be enslaved and, in the minds of settlers, stood in the way of the private exploitation of natural resources. They were not aimed at ridding the world of an “evil race” that spawned worldwide Communist conspiracies and gave rise to Marxism, “the Red Forces,” and democracy. In Nazi dogma, killing Jews meant ending the fountainhead of Bolshevism, democratic egalitarianism, and the corruption of the Aryan race.¹⁷

Furthermore, the genocidal slaughter of Native Americans primarily took place in the 1800s; consequently, it did not employ the informational technology provided by IBM in the 1930s. In regard to the employment of this technology for mass repression, the Nazi regime represents the sole historical precursor.

The United States

Hitler’s crimes occurred more than a half-century ago. Nevertheless, the files held by the FBI, believe it or not, contain Nazi allegations about German immigrants. Take, for instance, the FBI file on the most famous scientist of our time, Albert Einstein. The FBI hounded Einstein because he was a socialist and antifascist who, among other things, publicly urged individuals subpoenaed by the House Un-American Activities Committee to engage in civil disobedience—to invoke their First Amendment rights and refuse to testify before the Committee. Angered by Einstein’s antifascism, J. Edgar Hoover and his agents followed every lead in search of dirt.¹⁸ They tapped Einstein’s phone and read his mail. They shadowed him at public events. They filled his file with stories that were supplied by raving anti-Semites, con men, and lunatics about his connections with Communist conspirators. They even stuffed his file with false allegations taken from the Gestapo’s infamous “Jewish Desk” and the 1930s pro-Nazi German press.
The FBI hounded Paul Robeson and Martin Luther King Jr.—their files were also filled with rumors, gossip, and lies. So, too, were the files of ten million other Americans from all stations in life who were targeted by the FBI.

Of course, the government did not use the FBI files to round up millions of people and gas them. But the files were still employed as weapons of mass repression. During the so-called “McCarthy period,” initiated by Truman’s administration, these files caused job loss, blacklisting, family hardship, forced isolation, humiliation, and suicide.

The files also added fuel to the degradation of democracy. They provided a database for another weapon of mass repression—the undercover war against the American people—officially designated as the Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO). Frank Donner’s classic, *The Age of Surveillance*, which is based on his long experience as a practicing attorney and director of the ACLU’s Project on Political Surveillance, describes the endless number of “dirty tricks” and “black bag” operations conducted throughout the fifties, sixties, and seventies by government agencies. Apparently, affiliation with the FBI, CIA, Internal Revenue Service, military intelligence agencies, etc., enabled agents in these agencies to get away with slandering political dissenters, forging their signatures, burglarizing their homes and offices, tapping their phones unlawfully, instigating loss of employment, breaking up and harassing their families, disrupting political demonstrations, encouraging unlawful arrests and unwarranted IRS audits, and so on. In the cases of Fred Hampton, Mark Clark, and other African Americans, COINTELPRO is responsible for the assassination of at least twenty-eight people.\(^1\)

In addition to socialists, Communists, civil rights workers, Native American organizations, and the Black Panther Party, COINTELPRO aimed at repressing anyone who was actively opposed to an unjust war in which more than 58,000 American troops were killed and 153,000 wounded, and over three million Vietnamese were slaughtered.

Despite their enormity, these particular harms do not, it is true, place the use of weapons of mass repression by the United States in the same league as their use by Nazi Germany. But they
do justify a comparison that makes these weapons a paradoxical facet of American political reality.

To explain: the U.S. government is not the entity idealized by public-school civics lessons. Like Janus, the Roman God of gateways and exits, the Statue of Liberty, the gateway to the United States, signals a vista of democratic spirits and American dreams. But this seascape enters upon shores flooded by tides of political repression. The U.S. government is a two-faced institution, concurrently incorporating the renowned “democratic” and the imperialist “national security” states.

*Updating InfoTech*

The American political terrain is confusing, filled with roads that suddenly fork—one road leading toward the sun and the other into the shadows. But if we observe how the packs of jack-booted predators inhabiting the darker side accumulate knowledge about their victims, certain kinds of information and ways of gathering it stand out.

To begin, information identifying political dissidents is usually much broader than a statistical bureau gathers for demographics and counting, because it targets names of dissidents, places of work, political attitudes, subscriptions, names and addresses of friends, membership in political parties, attendance at demonstrations, identities of people invited to dinner, and so on. The compass of this information is literally unbounded because anything and everything may some day become relevant when the hunt begins.

Obviously, since large numbers of people are targeted, acquiring this information requires an army of official agents, support staffs, and voluntary “tipsters,” some of whom belong to citizens’ organizations. Clipping newspapers, recording speeches at demonstrations, copying letters and other documents, taking note of rumors, and making lists of people attending meetings require money, eyes, and hands—not just tale-tellers and imagination. The identification, seizure, imprisonment, and assassination of Communists and Socialists in Germany immediately after the Reichstag fire, for example, required far more men than the police
alone could provide. These additional forces were provided by thousands of volunteers, and the success of their dragnets was further assured by loyal Nazi party members, who, operating earlier as intelligence, had deliberately recorded names, residences, and workplaces of Communists and Socialists from information supplied by newspapers, spies, informants, thugs, and beatings. Later, these members also helped form the Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo), the secret state police. Consequently, assembling weapons of mass repression requires a complex “apparatus” combining governmental and nongovernmental organizations and individuals. This apparatus is set up by governments, political parties, and groups of citizens, and maintained at considerable cost, especially in a large country like the United States.

In addition, the official agencies, which, in the United States, include local, state, and federal police (plus the CIA and military intelligence), are confronted with assembling and maintaining “databases” storing information about their political victims. They must acquire “files” (“dossiers”) and the technology for storing and retrieving these files. Before the availability of computers and computer disks (i.e., large capacity “drives”), this requirement at the federal level meant storing hundreds of thousands of filing cabinets and boxes filled with millions of folders. Today, it also means computer-based data processing, storage, and retrieval systems networked across local, state, and federal agencies.

Furthermore, although this technology currently depends less on clerical workers who maintain and search thousands of filing cabinets and boxes to find folders requested by agents, the weapons being assembled by state-of-the-art technology still require an enormous amount of money and personnel.

Informational weapons developed by U.S. agencies now include sophisticated software as well as superior hardware for targeting people. This software identifies e-mail recipients, website visitations, and participants in political demonstrations. It can assemble “social networks” interrelating thousands of political dissidents who are not even linked by formally organized ties, such as affiliation with a political party or any group with a membership list.
Immediately after the Sept. 11 slaughter, Bush had a number of options. He could have resorted to police actions typically employed against terrorism throughout the Western world. In addition, he could have asked the United Nations Security Council for a multilateral enforcement strategy that would keep the United States from making more enemies than the enemies it killed. Instead, he invaded Afghanistan. Concurrently, Congress passed the Patriot Act, while Attorney General John Ashcroft rounded up and imprisoned thousands of Middle Eastern immigrants. Ashcroft announced that suspected terrorists would be tried secretly before military tribunals; and he charged civil libertarians who objected to his kangaroo courts with disloyalty.

During the year following Sept. 11, Bush, Ashcroft, and Congress began to build the legal infrastructure for employing weapons of mass repression. Justified by an alleged need to set aside judicial precedents in order to assist terror investigations, the government can now monitor religious and political institutions without suspecting criminal activity. It has prevented the courts from reviewing immigration hearings, and, to extort information, it has secretly detained thousands of people without charges. It has encouraged bureaucrats to resist public-records requests. It can prosecute librarians and other record keepers if they tell anyone that the FBI, when conducting a terror investigation, subpoenaed their records. Sidestepping current legal protections, the government may even monitor conversations between attorneys and federal prisoners, and deny legal aid for people accused of certain crimes. To assist what it defines as terror investigations, it may search and seize papers and effects of citizens without probable cause. Citizens can be jailed indefinitely without a trial or even being charged, and without being able to confront witnesses against them. Emulating ruthless dictatorships throughout the world, the government is betraying the Constitution by restricting information, freedom of assembly, legal representation, unreasonable searches, and the right to a speedy and public trial.
By now, the reader must be weary of hearing how our civil liberties are being attacked. But these attacks are listed to underscore the extraordinary breadth of an insidious legal infrastructure being set up in the name of a war against terrorism. Furthermore, this setup includes unlikely federal bureaus, devoted to the collection and dissemination of information. Our power-hungry attorney general, for example, is exerting political control over fairly independent agencies such as the Bureau of Justice Statistics and the National Institute of Justice.

Until passage of the Patriot Act, these agencies collected crime statistics and granted research awards reporting whether crime was increasing or decreasing, and suggesting the causes of crime and what to do about it. According to the National Resource Council, a branch of the National Academy of Sciences, crime data must be released promptly in order to maintain credibility and freedom from political maneuvering. But authority is now being taken from directors of these agencies and given directly to the Department of Justice (DoJ). Statistical reports and decisions regarding research grants now go to Attorney General Ashcroft’s office for political vetting before release. In addition, Bureau employees are forbidden to speak directly to journalists. All media calls are rerouted to a public-affairs officer. According to Professor Alfred Blumstein at Carnegie Mellon University, a founder of the Bureau of Justice Statistics, these are “the most intrusive efforts by the political appointees in the Justice Department to control the shaping and dissemination of statistics since I have been involved.”

Whenever Big Brother farts, we smell the stench of fascism.

Combating terrorism by introducing fascism at home will obviously affect the political climate in America for years to come. To underscore this point, comparisons have been made with periods when the abuse of executive power was rampant. Paul Krugman, whose economic commentary appears in the New York Times, observed that the attack on civil liberties bears an eerie resemblance to the period just after World War I. “John Ashcroft is re-enacting the Palmer raids, which swept up thousands of immigrants suspected of radicalism; the vast majority
turned out to be innocent of any wrongdoing, and some turned out to be U.S. citizens.” Alexander Cockburn, in a similar vein, mentioned the McCarthy blacklists of the 1950s and the spying on antiwar protesters in the 1960s. Russ Feingold, the sole member of Congress to vote against the infamous Patriot Act, in a speech reviewing political repression in the United States from the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 to the FBI Counter Intelligence Program of the 1960s, called it, “a breathtaking expansion of police power.”

Continuities

The Alien and Sedition Acts are significant because they discriminated against immigrants and discarded constitutional safeguards for citizens. They tripled the time an immigrant had to live in the United States before acquiring citizenship and gave the president power to arrest and deport summarily so-called “dangerous” aliens. The Acts made it illegal to publish statements against the government and against congressional legislation, including the Acts themselves. But the Acts boomeranged. They were largely directed at Irish working-class immigrants and French refugees who were protesting President John Adams’s administration. They also targeted newspaper editors who supported Thomas Jefferson. Widespread indignation, however, helped Jefferson win the presidential election in 1800. The Acts were repealed.

How did the Palmer raids compare to the situation today? Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer and his assistant, J. Edgar Hoover (who directed the General Intelligence Division of the DoJ), conducted the raids in 1920—climaxing a decades-old attempt by the government to crush working-class movements and left-wing political parties opposing the government and powerful industrial magnates. Before World War I, four leaders of the struggle for an eight-hour day were hanged for a terrorist act they did not commit. Strikes at Andrew Carnegie’s Homestead steel works and at John D. Rockefeller’s Colorado mine, mill, and smelter works were smashed by company thugs, state militia, and federal troops. By 1920, thousands of anarchists, socialists, and Communists, including Victor Berger, Nicola
Sacco, Bartolomeo Vanzetti,\textsuperscript{27} and Eugene V. Debs, were being imprisoned, murdered, or indicted on false charges for their political beliefs. (Debs, as presidential candidate for the Socialist Party, got one million votes while in prison for opposing the war.) Palmer responded to the postwar surge in union organizing and left-wing activities by exploiting the Red Scare that had been instigated by newspapers and corporations. The Red Scare was generated under the pretext that anarchists and Bolsheviks were about to overthrow the family, church, and government.

Palmer insisted that the government imprison or deport thousands of anarchists and Communists in order to prevent crime.\textsuperscript{28} Congress, he said, was ignoring the menace of “vast organizations” conspiring to abolish the established order. He claimed that the Congress was not helping him stamp out legally “these seditious societies,” even though the fires of revolution “were licking the altars of the churches, leaping into the belfry of the school bell, crawling into the sacred corners of American homes, seeking to replace marriage vows with libertine laws, burning up the foundations of society.” He proclaimed that anarchist fanatics and Bolsheviks, who had formed the Communist Labor Party, were not genuine idealists. They were aliens with criminal minds. Even though the Bolsheviks lived in the United States rather than Moscow, they were taking orders from Lenin and Trotsky.

Palmer reported that the DoJ had identified 60,000 Bolshevist agents. He declared, “The whole purpose of communism appears to be a mass formation of the criminals of the world to overthrow the decencies of private life, to usurp property that they have not earned, to disrupt the present order of life regardless of health, sex or religious rights.” Insisting, “first that the ‘Reds’ were criminal aliens and secondly that the American government must prevent crime,” he conducted a “preemptive strike” by rounding them up. People were beaten and arrested without warrants. His men smashed union offices and the headquarters of the Socialist and Communist parties. Over 5,000 people were arrested; some were deported. Shortly afterward, another 6,000 were arrested, mostly anarchosyndicalist members of the Industrial Workers of the World.
Palmer had announced that the raids were necessary because a Communist revolution was to take place on May Day. When that day passed without a revolution, critics used the lack of evidence to accuse him of abusing civil rights and exploiting the Red Scare to secure the presidential nomination of the Democratic Party.

Palmer was subsequently called before congressional committees and accused of using government funds unlawfully. He was charged with violating constitutional amendments regarding free speech, searches and seizures, due process, and cruel and unusual punishment. He had arrested people simply because they were members of political organizations listed by Hoover. He had planted covert FBI agents in Communist organizations and violated the Constitution by taking away citizenship from naturalized citizens.29

What can the historical attacks on civil liberties tell us about the recent attacks? Government officials have succeeded in doing what they will when political activities of noncitizens (or citizens who are labeled noncitizens) have been repressed. At this writing, enforcement agencies, with critical exceptions, have targeted noncitizens identified by racial profiling. Under this new racist McCarthyism, FBI dragnets have produced thousands of false arrests and unjustified detentions. Furthermore, the rationale (“investigators have their hands tied”) for chucking civil liberties is indefensible. Virtually all the persons arrested and charged with being terrorists, hyped by Ashcroft and the media, were drawn in by investigations initiated before Sept. 11 or based upon information known before that date. In fact, a congressional investigation into the failure of the FBI and CIA to prevent the atrocities on Sept. 11 suggests that qualitative changes in law enforcement, competent police procedures, and adequate airport screening would have made the Patriot Act superfluous.

Furthermore, European nations have experienced thousands of bombings, hostage-takings, kidnappings, bank robberies, and hijacked or bombed passenger jets at the hands of terrorists. The terrorists have been drawn from Basque, Corsican, Action Directe, Bader Meinhof, Japanese Red Army, Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Irish Republican Army cells.30 But unlike the U.S. response in the
case of Al Qaeda, Great Britain did not invade the United States because Irish-Americans harbored and funded IRA terrorists.

**Big Brother’s apparatus**

The Bush administration has incorporated at least twenty-two long-established agencies—including the Coast Guard, Customs Service, Secret Service, Immigration and Naturalization Services’s enforcement arm, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency into the Office of Homeland Security (OHS). In addition, the OHS will include an intelligence division that will receive information from the CIA and the FBI, presumably to investigate potential threats—thus enabling the government to shadow everyone.

*Homeland security*

The passage of the Homeland Security Act after the November 2002 elections, according to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), will

1. Endanger access to the Freedom of Information Act
2. Limit the OHS agencies’ accountability to the public
3. Prevent the Inspector General from auditing and investigating the agencies it controls

4. Strip OHS employees of the protections in the federal Whistleblower Protection Act

5. Allow employees to be fired easily (by forbidding them to form labor unions)

6. Let files on individual Americans be shared without regard to privacy rights.

These conditions will make the abuse of power a certainty.

Among these Kafkaesque attempts to cage American freedoms, the Act had also planned to ask a million people to help uncover terrorists by spying on their neighbors. The OHS intended to accomplish this goal by launching an experimental program entitled Terrorism Information and Prevention System (TIPS) in ten cities during the winter of 2002. While waiting for legislative approval, TIPS had originally asked over a million American truckers, letter carriers, train conductors, ship captains, utility employees, and other “well-positioned” private citizens to participate in “a formal way to report suspicious terrorist activity,” according to its government website. It was designated “a Citizen’s Corps program” providing workers with the opportunity to report “unusual activities” they might observe to law-enforcement agencies.

Civil libertarians immediately denounced TIPS as a device for spying on people’s mail, homes, and conduct without a warrant. Also, on 24 July 2002, in preparation for Ashcroft’s appearance before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Leahy’s press secretary, David Carle, sent out a “News Backgrounder” that explained “the historical precedent for Operation TIPS.” In World War I, the DoJ had established the American Protective League, which enrolled 250,000 “informants” with wide access in their communities to report suspicious conduct and investigate fellow citizens. The APL spied on workers and unions . . . and organized raids on German-language newspapers. With the power to make arrests, “members of the League used such methods as tar and feathers, beatings, and forcing those who were suspected of disloyalty to kiss the flag,” according to Leahy’s information.
After the war, the New York Bar Association damned the APL. It declared: “No other one cause contributed so much to the oppression of innocent men as the systematic and indiscriminate agitation against what was claimed to be an all-pervasive system of German espionage.”

Before the 2002 elections, a number of influential legislators had opposed the TIPS program, which had been besieged by criticism. Conservatives like Senator Joseph Lieberman, who had originally supported TIPS, backed off in the face of this criticism. Others agreed with the Texas lawyer Paul Coggins, who said the House of Representatives had choked on TIPS because it would have transformed 2002 into the “Year of the Rat” by getting Americans to spy on each other. Leahy led the fight to exclude TIPS in the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee and Rep. Dick Armey led the same fight in the House.

Critics insisted that most of the information sent to the agencies that managed TIPS would be motivated by political prejudice, racial profiling, religious bigotry, and perhaps even a fellow citizen’s taste in hair styles, clothing, or loud music. Leahy, as chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, justifiably asked Ashcroft whether people applying for a government loan or a job might be told that a suspicious activity had been logged in the OHS databank because somebody “didn’t like their dog barking in the middle of the night” or the “political shirt” they were wearing. In reply to his critics, Ashcroft pledged that citizen spies would not actually go inside homes to snoop, and that the DoJ would not maintain a central database for TIPS. In fact, he assured Leahy, even though millions of Americans would be asked to report suspicious activity, TIPS would not create a database that could be used against innocent citizens.

But Leahy did not buy Ashcroft’s spin on TIPS. Other legislators also recoiled from Ashcroft’s “friendly” neighborhood spy program. As a result, the government modified its sales pitch during the summer of 2002, without abandoning the program. It softened the DoJ website text calling for volunteers among the citizenry at large as well as postal workers and teamsters, but it continued to ask for volunteers.
By September, Coggins noted that some people asked to volunteer had refused to become TIPSters. He sarcastically observed,

Postal workers led a parade of occupations to opt out of the not-so-secret service. Congress is still skeptical of the attorney general’s watered-down proposal, which has more holes than Swiss cheese—and it smells rotten to the public as well. That means you and I probably won’t get our secret decoder rings in the mail anytime soon. No secret handshake. No license to snoop. For now, a plumber is just a plumber, and an exterminator is there to get rid of bugs—not plant them. For now, it’s still safe to chitchat with neighbors and officemates, read racy novels, watch steamy movies, cook foreign dishes and even speak a foreign language. We still live in “America, the Beautiful,” not “America, the Bugged.”

Fortunately, opposition from liberals and conservatives alike forced the administration to delete the TIPS program from the Homeland Security Act before it was passed. TIPS, for now, appears to be a dead letter.

Why then do we continue to write about the TIPS program, although it has been quietly put aside? The administration has, in the past, sent up trial balloons and dropped them if they generated enough opposition—only to revive them when the political climate allowed. Since knowledge is power, we will say a few more words about what almost happened and what may still be in store.

First, it is not generally known that without waiting for congressional approval, Ashcroft actually began to put TIPS into operation. Although the U.S. Postal Service had refused to cooperate with TIPS, we know that postal workers in at least one region were required to attend a meeting about the TIPS program and undergo training for snooping. The same holds for utility workers in a nearby county. This covert practice may still be in effect, for all we know, regardless of the fact that the TIPS program was deleted from the Homeland Security Act.

More important issues remain to be considered. Civil libertarians asked, “Why is the mobilization of millions of citizens
Besides overwhelming police with innumerable reports, what would be accomplished by TIPS? Would the OHS use TIPS to build urgently needed resources to identify and corral thousands of political dissidents? Are we dealing here with an effective response to terrorism, or the identification of political dissent?

These questions were implied whenever a critic asked how the Feds would deal with the tips. Where would they be stored? Who would analyze them? Granted, even though identifying genuine terrorists among millions of tips would be as difficult as finding a needle in a haystack, ready cash appeared to solve the storage problem: The administration was requesting 772 million dollars in its 2003 budget for the OHS’s information technology. Nonetheless, on the face of it, Ashcroft’s program still lacked credibility. Supposedly, TIPS was to help uncover terrorists—but it intended to accomplish this goal in just ten cities by recruiting a million volunteers. A million volunteers! How many more millions would Ashcroft have requested if TIPS had ever become a nationwide program? The numbers of volunteers simply did not make sense—unless for a hidden agenda. But what if TIPS is stood on its head, and we focus on the volunteers rather than their “suspects.” Was TIPS originally an excuse to build overnight a million-person database composed chiefly of chauvinistic, fearful, and self-righteous patriots? In the present political climate, who else would spy on their neighbors except people whose paranoiac reactions to panics, generated by repeated OHS alerts, could be readily exploited by demagogues? What might Ashcroft have accomplished with these eager volunteers? He could have used them to expand an aggressive right-wing mass movement. And a database identifying these people would have served as a valuable asset for collaborative efforts between the U.S. federal government and right-wing citizen groups targeting political dissidents.

TIPS—on a much grander scale—might have been designed to serve the aims adopted by the American Protective League when it repressed labor unions and antiwar movements in the First World War. This possibility would explain why Bush and Ashcroft stubbornly tried to keep the TIPS proposal alive—until they were forced to trade it for a sizeable vote on the rest of the Homeland Security Act. Indeed, the information technology required by
TIPS might have provided another weapon of mass repression regardless of officially acknowledged aims.

Finally, since TIPS was only recruiting citizens, a separate program planned to recruit noncitizens among Muslims. Toward this end, the Feds have encouraged police departments to interview thousands of Middle Eastern immigrants. The interviews, the Feds claimed, would be legal, voluntary and necessary for uncovering terrorist “sleepers”: “This is the least intrusive type of investigative technique that one can imagine,” Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff told Congress. “This is not rousting people, this is not detaining people, this is not arresting people. This is approaching people and asking them if they will respond to questions.” FBI Deputy Assistant Director Steve McCraw as well made everything sound totally benign and user-friendly. He said that such questioning is aimed at recruiting “individuals who may have information. They may not have information now, but they may come in contact with the information later.”

Ostensibly, the Feds were merely interested in possible witnesses, suspects, and covert informants in Muslim communities. But in setting up the “voluntary” spy network, police officers, for instance, have been asked to obtain a detailed profile on every subject, including his or her movements, past residences, travel, education, and family members. Subjects were asked to reveal their views of terrorism and the Sept. 11 attack, and to give names of people who might support terrorism. Now this sounds simple and straightforward. Yet, even aside from the question of how reliable or voluntary responses from immigrants would be under these conditions, the interviews would inevitably zero in on political and religious beliefs. An authority on the FBI’s history, Athan G. Theoharis, asks, “How do you identify someone who might engage in terrorist activities? You look at their political views. You examine how they feel about American foreign policy.”

Reinstalling Red Squads

While he was defending the TIPS program before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Ashcroft depicted TIPS as merely a “referral agency that sends information that is phoned in to appropriate federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.” When
questioned, he vaguely indicated that well-established policies already exist on how information can be used.

But we already know that these agencies have repressive policies and practices initiated decades ago by law-enforcement officials like J. Edgar Hoover. In addition to helping Hoover generate files on ten million individuals, police departments, especially in large cities, used the infamous Red Squads to maintain their own files on political dissenters and union activists. Moreover, although many police departments stopped updating these files after the Vietnam War, in March 2002, the ACLU again demonstrated the need for vigilance. It sued the city of Denver to preserve its police files on political dissenters until questions were answered about why they were kept. In this instance, the mayor of Denver, Wellington E. Webb, acknowledged on 13 March that the police have “3,200 files on individuals and about 208 records on organizations.” These files “have largely been collected in the last three years,” he said.

The files include political groups the police believe had caused problems in other cities. In addition, the police often classified political groups and activists as “criminal extremists.” This label was applied to the American Friends Service Committee, a Quaker group that won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1947. An Amnesty International organizer’s file listed his name, birth date, height, weight, eye color, hair color, driver’s license number, and vehicle manufacturer and model. It also identified him as a “criminal extremist.” Still others were identified in the same manner because they belonged to groups opposed to police brutality. Members of the Chiapas Coalition were labeled “criminal extremists” as well, because they opposed the “low-intensity war against the indigenous peoples in Chiapas and other states in Mexico” and the deleterious effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

A founder of the Chiapas Coalition, Kerry Appel, expressed anger and outrage. “I was incredulous at first,” he said. “We’re an open, public group. I think there’s a political agenda here within the police department to impose their own labels on human-rights and peace and justice organizations to criminalize them and erode
public confidence in the integrity of their work.” Sister Antonia Anthony, a Franciscan nun who spent twenty-five years living among Indian groups of United States and Mexico and in Chiapas from 1991–1995, also objected: “I really don’t like being on a police file, nor do I like the threat to our democracy of silencing protesters and stopping nonviolent actions.” The Chiapas Coalition, she said, is devoted to consciousness-raising and nonviolent protest. “We are not violent; we are not terrorists,” she said.

A panel of three former judges had found that none of the 3,200 files met legal criteria of reasonable standards of criminal activities. Mark Silverstein, ACLU executive director, expressed astonishment at the extent of the spying the mayor disclosed. He said, “Perhaps I’m too naive. But I thought that after the revelations of COINTELPRO and the Red Squads, I guess I would have thought that police departments would have found far less need to do this kind of thing.” Since the files documented police misconduct, he exclaimed, “We need to know why police regarded peaceful political protests as crime scenes.”

Similar questions were being asked a month later in March 2002, when the New York Police Department (NYPD) petitioned a federal district judge to lift restrictions that curtail police monitoring of political activity. These restrictions, called the “Handschu guidelines,” stem from a 1971 suit filed by sixteen plaintiffs, including one Barbara Handschu, who contended the department had violated their civil rights by unlawful surveillance. In 1985, the guidelines were approved because the court had recognized decades-old law-enforcement abuses committed by the NYPD’s notorious Red Squad. Still, even though the guidelines prohibited investigations of lawful political activity, the department wanted them lifted in order to fight terrorism. Newsday reporter Leonard Levitt found this justification absurd. He reported that the New York police commissioner “could not cite one instance, real or hypothetical, in which the Handschu guidelines hindered police in fighting terrorism, the only thing to be said with certainty is that his attempt to abolish them is the Police Department’s first power grab since the World Trade Center attack.” Rather than the
Handschu guidelines, the NYPD and FBI’s failure to detect terrorists in the past was due to their stupidity and laziness, according to Levitt. Unfortunately, in February 2003, a federal district judge, Charles S. Haight, announced that he might expand New York’s police powers in March by “modifying” the guidelines. (His modifications, according to civil libertarians, would make the guidelines unenforceable.) Haight’s announcement also suggested that he had accepted the claim that the guidelines were weakening NYPD’s ability to fight terrorism, and believed NYPD officials would behave properly because they had solemnly promised to respect civil liberties.

Chicago was another major city with a history of Red Squads. During the congressional debate over antiterrorism provisions, some representatives mistrusted agents who claimed their hands were tied before the Patriot Act. For instance, Rep. Janice D. Schakowsky (D-Ill.) recalled, “In the 1970s, I was part of a housewife community organization that it turns out was spied upon secretly by a unit of the Chicago Police Department.” This unit was Chicago’s Red Squad and it spied on, infiltrated, and harassed a wide variety of political groups.

Students at the University of Chicago also recalled the city’s infamous Red Squad, known officially as the Subversive Activities Unit, when they rallied in February 2001 to defend freedom of speech and oppose political police. They protested Judge Richard Posner’s Appeals Court decision granting the police permission to collect political data on any community group or organization, and to label, at their discretion, certain groups to be “extreme.” Police are allowed to place these “extreme” groups under surveillance, and to film routinely all protest demonstrations “for training purposes.”

Chicago’s Red Squad had maintained “subversive dossiers” on more than eight hundred organizations, including the United Methodist Church, League of Women Voters, PTA, Catholic Interracial Council, NAACP, and Planned Parenthood Association. It collected information on 258,000 individuals and gave reports on their lawful political activity to the FBI and CIA. It gave nine hundred reports to the U.S. Civil Service Commission, potentially to be used in denying job applicants federal employment.
It perpetrated numerous crimes by burglarizing organizational files and membership lists, illegally wiretapping homes of political activists, infiltrating hundreds of organizations, and trying to sabotage such organizations as the National Lawyers Guild.

Posner tried to clean up his nauseating act. He granted that most of the groups previously harmed by Chicago’s Red Squad, “including most of the politically extreme groups, were not only lawful, and engaged in expressive activities protected by the First Amendment, but also harmless.” Posner reassuringly declared, “The era in which the Red Squad flourished is history, along with the Red Squad itself. . . . The culture that created and nourished the Red Squad has evaporated.” Referring to the Cold War, he concluded that the “instabilities of that era have largely disappeared,” and legal controls over police—and legal sanctions for the infringement of constitutional rights—have multiplied.

Is Posner sincere? His rationales suggest serious delusion. He allowed police to decide what kind of “extreme behavior” merits surveillance even though the reasons city officials gave for needing this power were demonstrably false, as was noted by the original federal judge, Ann Williams, when, as recently as 1999, she rejected the city’s request. It was shown in that trial that the police could carry out their investigations without increasing their powers. A police sergeant involved in antiterrorism testified that at no time did the consent decree ever interfere with legitimate police investigations.

In Philadelphia, the so-called City of Brotherly Love, the police department’s Red Squads, consisting of an intelligence unit and a heavily armed swat team, were especially egregious. Their harmful activities include illegal surveillance, infiltration, wrongful arrests, and brutal assaults on African American organizations. Yet, even though its police department was barred in 1987 from political spying without special permission, the Philadelphia Red Squads are still scanning the city for political prisoners.

Vertical integration

Representatives of the new Red Squads in cities across the nation have been collaborating. In 2002, Mara Verheyden-Hilliard
of Partnership for Civil Justice, who is representing demonstrators in
a lawsuit against Washington DC police, believed that Philadelphia
cops were helping DC police identify and arrest activists at a DC
demonstration. A Morristown, New Jersey, police sergeant has
appeared at demonstration after demonstration. The Morristown
officer was spotted at the May Day protest in New York, as were DC
and Philadelphia police. Even someone from the Drug Enforcement
Administration was there. In a discussion with an environmental
activist, Rob Fish, some of these police have revealed that they
knew that he was beaten up in DC and that a police officer took
away his camera. They also knew he had been to Ruckus Society
training in Florida during spring break. They were very open about
who they were, some handing Fish their business cards.

Besides this interagency collaboration, Ashcroft’s Joint
Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) have also been setting the stage
for the national integration of present-day Red Squads. In
Portland, Oregon, municipal hearings had shown that local offi-
cers recruited into the JTTF had been deputized as federal officers
with security clearance; therefore, they could not disclose assign-
ments to anyone outside their unit, including police commanders.
Independent oversight by Portland commissions was prohibited
as well. Even the mayor and police chief could not review JTTF
files. Nonetheless, despite these shocking conditions, Portland
officials renewed the JTTF contract.

The dissidents burned at the JTTF’s stake will not be limited
to “Reds.” Diane Lane, a member of Portland Copwatch, reports
that the FBI’s “domestic terrorism” chief has labeled vandalism
against business property (including the release of minks) by
environmentalists as “eco-terrorism,” even though their actions
have not caused personal injury and could be handled by criminal
statutes. Labor unions are also targets. In early 2001, she notes, “a
labor union made plans to organize a rally at a construction site,
unaware that a JTTF agent had informed the site manager about
their intentions. On the day of the rally, union participants found
the site shut down.”

Clear evidence that JTTF targets activists has also come
directly from an FBI source. During the Portland JTTF hearings,
an agent stated that the task force would investigate violations of the Hobbs Act, which forbids interference with interstate commerce through the use or threat of force, violence, or fear. Those violations can be prosecuted under the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), originally installed in 1970 to go after the Mafia. During the past decade, RICO has been applied to various activists using civil disobedience. But last year, in Philadelphia, a business owner filed a RICO lawsuit against protesters who demonstrated peacefully against animal cruelty outside of his store, which showcases fur coats.

The FBI had created six regional task forces before Sept. 11, in addition to thirty-four in major cities, with plans to increase that number continually. After Sept. 11, the Department of Justice mandated antiterrorist task forces in every federal judicial district. On 1 December 2001, the FBI also instructed all of its fifty-six field offices to establish JTTFs.

The integration of local and federal agencies does not end with the JTTFs. In “Fighting Terror with Databases,” Jim McGee of the Washington Post points out that the Feds are creating a massive intelligence-gathering system that will incorporate state-of-the-art computer networks linking federal agents with thousands of police departments. Local authorities may be empowered to obtain virtually all the FBI’s most sensitive information under laws being considered in Congress. The federal remaking of local police is a significant aspect of the new system.

Of course, some officials claim that times have changed, and political repression is gone. James Q. Wilson, who has advised American presidents on criminal justice, also claims that a return to systematic political repression by local police is unlikely. Like Posner, he reassures Americans that the political passions behind the Red Scare of the 1950s no longer exist; consequently, “the country has responded to [Sept. 11] in a sober and adult way.” Yet, breathalyzers do not have to be administered to Ashcroft’s staff to estimate whether his Department’s Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) is one of these sober responses. Officially, RISS projects concentrate on drug and organized crime activities. Nevertheless, since criminal intelligence units are used in
many jurisdictions to monitor political suspects as well, they also affect the information that RISS systems store. To curb abuses of criminal intelligence data banks, the DoJ, as early as 1993, passed guidelines restricting RISS databank usage for politically motivated crimes. The rules provide the usual cover for enforcement officials, since they explicitly (but not actually) prohibit inclusion and sharing of data on dissidents.

We have noted that RISS was in operation before Sept. 11, but Gerald Lynch, a RISS official, believes that the Patriot Act will make it easier to place “potential terrorists” in “some form of [RISS] database so they can be looked at very carefully.” He indignantly justified the official position, declaring that before the Patriot Act, a terrorist’s name could not be put in a database if there was no crime.

Years before Ashcroft’s barbershop quartet harmonized about a New Dawn in Law Enforcement, Mitzi Waltz, a writer and psychologist, contended in 1997 that local political spying was on the rise, with help from above.44 “Like a vampire who has developed a tolerance for garlic, Red Squads are back,” Waltz affirmed.45 Her research is also exceptional because it spots studies conducted during the nineties by RAND,46 the Heritage Foundation, and several private companies in the security industry calling for the creation of an all-embracing law-enforcement system. The studies showed that the public could be scared into supporting increased spying by the rising specter of terrorism.47 Furthermore, after evaluating antiterrorist measures in other countries, the studies suggested that “multi-jurisdictional taskforces” offered the best way to sidestep civilian oversight. Waltz emphasized that “the RAND report explicitly touts taskforce participation as a way to get around local laws restricting political intelligence work, and also promotes taskforces as a mechanism for putting such operations on the local and state agenda by providing funding, equipment, publicity, and other inducements.” As we have seen four years later, when the FBI was setting up JTTF agencies, it usually succeeded in getting local police to circumvent local control of political surveillance.

The RAND report indicated that task forces would have other benefits. The police are responsive to demands from the
corporations and organizations that influence political or budgetary matters. As a result, police interpret “terrorism” more broadly than the Feds, applying the label to environmentalist, animal-rights, and union activities. Police working with private security officers harassed protestors attempting to close down the contaminated Hanford Nuclear Reservation in southern Washington. During the Detroit newspaper strike, newspaper companies paid the police department over two million dollars for helping break the strike. Couple this with the Anti-Terrorism Act, which redefines many types of heretofore lawful advocacy as “terrorism,” for the purposes of federal prosecution, and the possibilities are alarming.

**Spying in cyberspace**

The American Civil Liberties Union states: “Intelligence gathering on political activity reached a crescendo in the 1960s. . . . Thousands of detailed dossiers were produced on politically active Americans who had committed no crimes.” In the 1970s, the Justice Department’s Interdivisional Intelligence Unit computer indexed these files in order to harass activists with tax audits and disinformation campaigns. Recent developments, however, are not merely aimed at surveillance. They are targeting more important possibilities for the police state and require state-of-the-art technology and a new governmental apparatus to do the job.

The Bush administration is certainly aware that a radically different dimension in the dissemination of information not controlled by the government or the corporate media has emerged in recent decades. It is now designing the apparatus that will monitor, intervene into, and, if deemed necessary, destroy the radical efforts being made to communicate in this dimension. At this writing, the government is flying a number of proposals for controlling “cyberspace” and it is awaiting responses from security and high-tech corporations before implementing them. These proposals include, among other things, a “National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace,” installing a “technology czar” with a cabinet post, and creating a federally funded Network Operations Center.
to monitor internet traffic—e-mail in particular. Whatever else will be accomplished by these proposals, Big Brother obviously intends to build an apparatus for controlling political communication on the Internet.

Also, unconcerned with state and local law-enforcement abuses, the DoJ, National Security Agency (NSA), and CIA are now spending billions of dollars to update their technology for spying on the Internet. Wayne Madsen, a senior fellow at the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), indicates that state enforcement agencies are joining the inquisitors. He describes a variety of technologies already in use by RISS agencies for creating a relational database identifying noncriminal social networks composed of individuals or groups, a political group’s banking and commercial ties, and other information on organizations, including their membership lists. The technologies will not be restricted to real terrorists, because these agencies will expand “terrorism” to cover groups that openly use the Internet to marshal resistance to corporate-inspired globalization and war.

The government has additional forensic network-monitoring systems. The snooperware Carnivore copies e-mail messages and stores them in federal databases. (This “packet-sniffing” technology has been in operation since 1990, and, with or without court permission, gathers information by sampling network packets and storing segments filtered by predefined criteria—composed of words like protest march, civil disobedience, globalization, Allah, and Dubya.) Also, the government can utilize computer viruses including Trojan-horse viruses to either destroy personal computer files or examine files and secretly transmit copies to an external database. Even keystrokes made on home computers can be monitored in secret while they are being made.

In addition, it is important to realize that although the courts have turned down legislative attempts to block access to Internet sites, this blocking can be done. Although a European commission recently decided to leave Internet hubs unregulated, these hubs can be regulated. Websites that feature news, legal documents and articles about the worldwide struggle over “cyber rights” and losses of “privacy rights” demonstrate the fragile status of free speech on the Web.
Monopoly control of Internet service providers (ISP) may also restrict free speech. Michael Powell, Colin Powell’s son—another Bush appointee—chairs the Federal Communication Commission. Considering government public-interest regulations to be oppressive because they do not allow corporations to act as they please, he has introduced changes in the law that will enable monopoly-controlled service providers to censor the Web. These providers may eventually accomplish this goal by charging more for ISP “packages” that provide access to progressive websites, slowing access to these websites, or blocking access altogether.

Blocking hyperlinks also censors free speech. The University of California at San Diego, for instance, citing the Patriot Act, has ordered a student organization, the Ché Café Collective, to remove hyperlinks on a School of Education website to an alleged “terrorist” organization. University officials claim that Ché provides “communications equipment, personnel, and facilities” to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC)—listed by the Department of State as a “Designated Terrorist Organization”—by publishing a website that simply contains a link to FARC’s webpage!

The religious right failed to push through legislation censoring the Internet during the “CyberPorn” hysteria in the 1990s. Still, such attempts continue. Furthermore, a real terrorist attack or a government hoax could enable the administration to secure legislation censoring the Internet in the name of national security.

One can find every conceivable political viewpoint on the Internet, as well as information that has doubtful validity. Still, antiwar and antiglobalization protests have expanded the websites that now provide up-to-the-minute news, exposés, and analyses. Although the Internet is restricted to people with access to computers, it does weaken the stranglehold exerted by the corporate television and publishing industry. For instance, the Pentagon-controlled media minimized civilian deaths from aerial bombardment, while Marc W. Herold’s study, which reported almost four thousand civilian deaths in the first sixty days of the Afghanistan war, could only be found on the Internet. Furthermore, numerous
pages maintained by individuals at home and abroad are complementing these websites.\textsuperscript{55} The evidence is clear that Sept. 11 was due to agency failures and not our constitutional liberties; scuttling these liberties only gives federal agencies power to oppress dissidents, not terrorism.

\textbf{Clicking Restart}

\textit{Stealing e-mail}

An American counterpart to Tomás de Torquemada, the first Inquisitor General of Castile in 1483, who burned thousands of Protestants and witches at the stake, is stalking America. We have disclosed Attorney General John Ashcroft’s true nature without a UN inspection team. But questions still remain. For instance, does Sept. 11 explain his ruthless devotion to domestic repression? Or did other events account for this frightening obsession?

To find answers, we should first recall the increasing anti-government protests since 1999, and the government response. At the start, fifty thousand protesters converged on Seattle, and rambunctiously denounced World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations—forcing them to end in failure despite mass arrests, tear gas, and battering police. Additional demonstrations in Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and Washington DC protested the policies and terms of trade set by the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. These global agencies were accused of ignoring the cruel repression of independent labor organizations, while encouraging substandard wages, child labor, brutal sweatshops, and massive pollution in less-developed countries.\textsuperscript{56}

Countering the 1999 explosions of popular anger, government and business leaders of thirty-four North, Central, and South American nations hastily staged a Summit “Free-Trade of the Americas Act” Conference in Quebec five months later. This time, while secret negotiations were taking place, in a greater show of force, columns of police in full riot gear were lined up along a two-mile chain-link fence erected to keep protesters miles from the conference. For two days and nights, the police lobbed tear gas and shot rubber bullets at the protesters, keeping
them outside the fence and miles from the meetings.

While the protests were taking place in Quebec City, U.S. Secret Service and FBI agents presented a court order to the Seattle Independent Media Center (IMC) to hand over logs and other records pertaining to coverage of the protests. The FBI also imposed a gag order on the IMC, forbidding individuals at the Center to discuss the court order or even acknowledge the existence of the gag order itself.

The Seattle IMC pulled a legal defense team together with the aid of free-speech advocates on the Internet, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Electronic Privacy Information Center, and the Center for Constitutional Rights. Six days after the first visit by the Feds, when a legal challenge to the gag order was imminent, the order was vacated. Ashcroft’s DoJ knew that their gag order would never have stood up in court at that time. Of course, it would have stood up after the Homeland Security Bill was passed, but the gag order was submitted to IMC on 21 April 2001—almost five months before 11 September.

But the FBI did not withdraw the court order for IMC’s logs. To obtain this order while the Quebec conference was underway, the Feds had claimed they required the IMC’s “server logs” in order to discover the identity of an anonymous correspondent who had stolen sensitive documents from Canadian police and then posted them to the IMC website. The Secret Service was involved because the agents falsely claimed that the posted documents contained details of George W. Bush’s travel itinerary. At the time, Bush was attending the Summit of the Americas in Quebec City.

The court order was based on additional misinformation. First, it defined the IMC as an Internet service provider (ISP), although an ISP is a commercial entity rather than a news organization. On the contrary, since journalists posting stories or photographs to IMC websites are part of a news organization, they are entitled to the same constitutional protections as any other member of the news media. In addition, anonymity on the Internet is particularly important because it enables individuals to disguise identifying information that might lead to their persecution. In fact, to some degree, the Constitution has recognized a journalist’s right to resist court orders aimed at disclosing
this information because they threaten a free press. As a result, history reveals many examples of anonymity in public discourse; even the Federalist Papers were published under a fictitious name. Upon inquiring into the validity of the Fed’s claims, IMC volunteers discovered that police in Quebec had already identified and arrested three suspects in the stolen documents case, without any information from the IMC. The people at IMC felt justified in resisting the order because compliance would have meant handing over the individual Internet addresses of over 1.25 million journalists, readers, and technical volunteers who accessed the IMC website during the protests. (Even if this figure included repeated communications from the same persons, the number of unduplicated addresses would still be massive.) Since they could have simply requested the identity of the anonymous person rather than try to net all the fish in the sea, IMC counsel Lee Tien, of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, declared: “This kind of fishing expedition is another in a long line of over-broad and onerous attempts to chill political speech and activism. Back in 1956, Alabama tried to force the NAACP to give up its membership lists—but the Supreme Court stopped them. This order to IMC, even without the ‘gag,’ is a threat to free speech, free association, and privacy.”

The confidence trick justifying the court order was small change compared to what happened next. Despite knowing about the Canadian arrests of the people who stole the information, the Feds claimed that they still needed the IMC logs to catch the thieves. They neither amended nor withdrew the order against the IMC for weeks. Instead, they drove the volunteer organization crazy and sidetracked the attention of their personnel and legal resources.

IMC believed that the timing of the original order, issued while mass protests were still underway in Quebec City, suggested that the government intended to intimidate IMC journalists covering the protests—a suggestion strengthened by its failure to withdraw the order after the Canadian arrests.

Suddenly, six whole weeks after IMC had received the order and on the eve of the IMC’s planned court filing, the government
withdrew the order for the log. IMC speculated that government lawyers knew the order would be struck down on constitutional grounds, and decided to retreat rather than lose face in court. But this important point was made by IMC counsel Nancy Chang of the Center for Constitutional Rights: “Although the court order has been withdrawn, the IMC’s concerns over the government’s ability to use internet technology for surveillance of political activists continue to linger.”

Chang’s concerns are certainly justified, because the crime scene leading to the court order may have had nothing to do with Bush’s security. After all, the so-called “server logs” contained an unbelievable number of Internet addresses of antiglobalization activists all over the world. What a database! For the FBI and CIA, it would have been manna from heaven. Can any sensible person really believe that the Feds were simply interested in finding a single communication from an anonymous person?

You do not have to be Sherlock Holmes to recognize the forces behind this particular crime scene. First, the court order was served almost five months before Sept. 11. If it had been served afterwards, the order would have been for finding terrorists rather than thieves. But it still would be used to plunder the database to create weapons of mass repression.

There should be no illusions about the neofascist propensities of the Bush administration. The events of Sept. 11 and concern about the nation’s security were not the sparks that fired its attempts to update its weapons of mass repression. It began to update these weapons to forestall the new phase in American protest movements heralded by the Seattle demonstrations.

Databases and mass arrests

As Yogi Berra declared: “It’s déjà vu all over again.” Like Orwell’s animal farm, replete with a Lilliputian Genghis Khan and his cackling chicken hawks taking up arms in the name of freedom, the president and his cronies have astonished everybody by their demagogic opposition to every domestic policy that would undercut their imperial aims. These “compassionate conservatives,” “friends of the environment,” “guardians of
“peace,” and “true patriots” have refused to provide medical care or prescription drugs for people without health insurance. They have made it harder for poor and middle-class Americans who face overwhelming medical bills to file for bankruptcy. They have ignored unemployment and denied funds for strengthening workplace safety, training programs for dislocated workers, and advanced training for pediatricians. They have slashed budgets for public-housing repairs, new libraries, and research into alternative energy sources. They have cut massively into the Environmental Protection Agency budget and pulled out of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol agreement on global warming. They have rejected an accord enforcing the 1972 treaty banning germ warfare and have jettisoned the ABM treaty, even though it has restricted the proliferation of intercontinental ballistic missiles for half a century.59

On the international front, this administration has kept faith with the CIA’s refusal to confront its own crimes. Examples of these crimes? The CIA backed the violent overthrow of the democratically elected governments in Chile, Guatemala, Indonesia, and Iran. It supported terrorists in Nicaragua, Brazil, Uruguay, Cuba, Zaire, East Timor, Angola, and South Africa. In fact, one year after 11 September 2001, when Americans mourned the thousands killed by Islamic terrorists, Chileans angrily observed another anniversary. They protested the overthrow, on 11 September 1973, of President Salvador Allende’s democratic government and the slaughter of thousands after the U.S.-backed coup launched seventeen years of brutal military dictatorship.60 Not surprisingly, Bush refused in 2002 to allow the world’s first permanent International Criminal Court ever to try U.S. forces for war crimes, genocide, and other crimes against humanity.61

Official responses to antiglobalization demonstrators who have raised these national and international issues have been brutal. Between the Quebec City demonstration and Sept. 11, for instance, over 100,000 protesters from all over Europe filled the streets of Genoa, Italy, to continue protesting the July 2001 G-8 Summit Meeting on international policies and their effect on poverty, inequality, violent repression, and environmental
degradation. The Genoa demonstration was backed by simultaneous protests in two hundred other cities around the globe. Hundreds of demonstrators were arrested in Genoa, and over five hundred protesters were left injured and one dead after violent clashes with the police. Even foreign journalists were beaten. John Elliot, a Sunday Times correspondent, reported in the 22 July 2001 issue: “I was taking in the infernal scene of a water cannon truck cleaving through clouds of tear gas when I felt a massive blow to the back of my head.” Two policemen had hit him with a club and then dragged him along the ground toward a signal box, where he was ordered to put his head on a steel train track. The policemen kicked his head and legs until a senior officer commanded them to charge him with “resisting arrest with violence” and he was taken to the police station.

During the Genoa protest, a police squad composed of neo-fascists ruthlessly clubbed students sleeping at the Armando Diaz school complex, where protesters committed to nonviolence had been staying. Witnesses described students, Americans among them, crouching as they were kicked, pummeled with clubs, and thrown down stairs. Emergency-room doctors said some of the injured would have died without treatment. Television crews arriving on the scene later filmed pools of blood and teeth knocked out during the raid. Despite this fascist brutality and the students’ nonviolent demeanor, Silvio Berlusconi, Italy’s TV mogul and prime minister, called them “terrorists.” As far as he was concerned, the students got what they deserved. The Genoa police also must have got what they wanted—the identities of hundreds, if not thousands, of protesters processed at police stations.

Since Sept. 11, the U.S. police have responded to demonstrations with measures not seen since the Vietnam War. Two weeks after the anniversary of Sept. 11, demonstrations took place in Washington DC. On the day before the main march, about two hundred demonstrators, led by members of a group called the Anticapitalist Convergence, followed behind the banner “Globalization, Not Devastation” until they encountered a line of DC Metro Police. The marchers turned south, only to encounter more police. The protesters were blocked—unable to
move forward or backward. Suddenly, according to observers, a “black-clad” individual broke a window of the CitiBank at the corner. Where this “hit and run” individual came from was unclear. The blocked-in demonstrators had been marching peaceably. Comically, the police had more than enough men to surround two hundred demonstrators but not enough to capture and arrest the one man (one of their own?) who broke the window.

Over one hundred demonstrators, some of whom seemed to have been targeted, were hauled off on transit buses parked close to the bank, and driven for processing (photographing, fingerprinting, etc.) to the Police Training Academy.

Elsewhere, a larger crowd of demonstrators had gathered in Pershing Park. Thousands of police pulled from outlying regions and city precincts soon surrounded them. Since the demonstrators were outnumbered, reporters asked why so many police were present, and were told that the gathering provided an opportunity for a “training exercise.”

A first-hand account by a 69-year-old father relates how the police conducted themselves. The father and his daughter Alexis approached Freedom Plaza and found it surrounded by police, who refused to allow any demonstrators to enter. When they moved to Pershing Park, it was also surrounded, although the police were allowing demonstrators to enter. The father said that after ten minutes, “the police ordered us to move into the park.” The father and daughter obeyed, as did every demonstrator around them. Soon, folding their banner, they made two attempts to leave the park by adjacent streets. They were blocked from leaving both times, and then forced back. Demonstrators arriving during this time were permitted (some said later “ordered” or “encouraged”) to enter the park.

Without warning, riot-equipped police—with long black coats and helmets resembling Darth Vader in *Star Wars*—gripped their batons with two hands and began a shoulder-to-shoulder advance into the area, forcing the demonstrators back. No demonstrator offered resistance. Packed together and confined to a small area where they were hardly visible from the streets, the police began seizing demonstrators and pinning their arms with plastic cuffs
behind their backs. Busses transported the demonstrators to the Police Academy. Despite the short distance between the park and the Academy, the bus trip was deliberately prolonged, lasting an unbelievable fourteen hours. The demonstrators were forced into seats with their hands tightly bound behind their backs and their pleas for loosening the painful handcuffs were ignored.

Even though they were only accused of failing to “obey a police command,” the demonstrators had all their personal belongings, including belts and shoelaces, confiscated. Each person was fingerprinted, photographed, and locked up for over twenty-four hours in a gymnasium for an offense that had been compared to a traffic violation.

Assigned to a specific gym mat on the floor, demonstrators were shackled at all times. The shackle connected one wrist to the opposite ankle, making it impossible to stand erect. Kneeling or moving from their assigned spot was forbidden. During this time, paperwork recording the demonstrators’ names, addresses, telephone numbers, color of their hair and eyes, etc., was completed. The police refused the prisoners access to legal assistance. They said that agreeing to pay a fine of $50 would result in speedy processing and early release. Anyone refusing to pay and insisting on a court hearing was threatened with imprisonment for two or three more days until Monday. The prisoners were not told that local residents were released without payment for a traffic citation if they agreed to appear later in court. Obviously, the police were violating the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution by extorting admissions of guilt and fines from their political prisoners.

Washington DC Police Chief Charles Ramsey, according to Alexis’s father, brazenly stated that his department had executed “a preemptive strike” against American citizens who had committed no crimes. Unbelievably, Ramsey said that the demonstrators would have broken the law had they not been arrested in advance. But no crimes were identified nor was evidence provided to support Ramsey’s claim. In addition, he did not apologize for the police brutality. Some demonstrators were beaten for attempting the mildest form of civil disobedience (e.g., going limp rather than walking voluntarily to the buses).
Shamefully, the police “training exercise” included a mass arrest. Over 650 protesters were arrested and abused that day, and their identities were added to the police database even though they had broken no law.66

Some bystanders, including pedestrians on the way to work, were also arrested. Significantly, reporters from DC Independent Media, another online news service, were targeted, arrested, and detained so they could not report the police action. Although a U.S. News & World Report photographer was also arrested and a Washington Times photographer was pushed back from the police line, the corporate press and TV stations merely reported that hundreds of arrests were made. They did not expose the police brutality or the fact that some “Jane Does” who refused to pay a fine and demanded that charges be dropped were kept in jail for almost a week.

Let us stop for a moment to relate a striking parallel to this event that occurred three decades earlier, in Berkeley, California, when hundreds of people, including high-school students during lunch period, marched with signs protesting the Vietnam War down University Avenue until a police cordon blocked their way. On being ordered to disperse, they found that police had blocked the streets in front, behind, and to either side. Police bullhorns informed the perplexed and terrified teenagers and adults that they were being arrested for refusing to disperse. The marchers were herded into a large empty lot where police, in addition to obtaining names and addresses, fingerprinted and photographed hundreds of people one at a time. Buses for these people and trucks for the unloaded camera and fingerprinting equipment had been parked before the demonstration on the side of the lot. The arrest was unquestionably an attempt to terrorize Berkeley demonstrators. But it was also designed to obtain their names, mug shots, fingerprints, etc., for government files.

The taking of political prisoners in Washington DC years later was aimed at training a new generation of police in crowd control, extortion, and terror. These tactics were also designed to gather information identifying large numbers of political dissidents. Furthermore, since the arrests took place in the nation’s capital,
they were probably cleared with Ashcroft as well as the mayor.

After the “preemptive arrests” conducted by DC police under Chief Ramsey, attorneys for student protestors filed a class-action suit against Ashcroft, the U.S. Parks Department, and the Washington DC government and police department. This suit indicted the practice of “trap and arrest,” in which police surround persons engaged in lawful activity and prevent them from leaving the area. It also indicted the policy of arresting the journalists, bystanders, and observers caught within “trap-and-arrest” zones. The use of excessive force, abusive confinement, threats to secure no contest pleas, and the practice of denying access to counsel and other Miranda rights were also cited. The suit protested keeping arrested individuals in handcuffs for up to twenty-four hours or more, including forcing individuals into a fetal position by handcuffing one wrist to the person’s opposing ankle. It requested compensation for denying the plaintiffs’ rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.67


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**NOTES**

1. These logos are reproductions of the originals produced by the German IBM subsidiary in 1933 and the Pentagon in 2002. In the Dehomag logo, above, Übersicht may be translated as “oversight”; and Lochkarten, as “punch cards.” In the Pentagon seal, DARP (faintly visible here) stands for “Defense Advanced Research Program.” “Scientia est Potentia” is translatable as “Science is Power.”


3. A central computer had fortunately backed up the messages, one of which authorized Oliver North to meet secretly with the drug lord, General Noriega, to provide a conduit for the illegal sales.

4. Subsequently, his conviction was dismissed on a technicality: Poindexter had been granted immunity in exchange for his testimony before Congress, even
though that testimony turned out to be false. In the end, George H. W. Bush pardoned the principals in the affair in 1992.


6. We largely agree with Bertram Gross, a distinguished and prescient scholar who believed that fascism in America would arise in graduated steps—differently from German fascism. See Bertram Gross, Friendly Fascism: The New Face of Power in America (New York: M. Evans, 1980)

7. See William Rivers Pitt with Scott Ritter, War on Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn’t Want You to Know (New York: Context Books, 2002). Pitt notes that Hussein is “a secular leader who has worked for years to crush fundamentalist Islam within Iraq, and if he were to give weapons of any kind to Al Qaeda, they would turn them on him (9).

8. These resolutions concern ballistic missiles with range greater than ninety miles as well as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. UN inspectors did find missiles with a slightly greater range.


11. This putsch involves more than Iraq because it is being accompanied by other ruthless measures for expanding the American Empire.

12. Other subsidiaries also provided support. These were located in conquered or so-called “neutral” countries, including France, Holland, Norway, Belgium, Austria, Poland, Italy, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, and Spain.


14. All countries Germany occupied (and their concentration camps) had this equipment.

15. See Black, 332 (our emphasis).


20. In its earliest stages, the Gestapo was actually an arm of the Nazi Party, not a government agency.

21. After the case of Jose Padilla (a U.S. citizen held indefinitely at a South Carolina military base without charges and without access to an attorney after being arrested at a Chicago airport for allegedly planning to explode a “dirty” bomb), this denial has applied to citizens as well as noncitizens.

22. With this new procedure, the process has sometimes been delayed for a month or two.


24. The parallel between the Alien & Sedition Acts and Ashcroft’s treatment of Middle Eastern immigrants is eerie.

25. A bomb was thrown at police at a Haymarket Square rally in Chicago by an individual who was never identified. Seven leaders were sentenced to death and one to fifteen years imprisonment—four were hanged, one committed suicide in prison, and death sentences of two were commuted to life. The three surviving prisoners were pardoned in 1974 by Governor Altgeld on the grounds that no evidence had been presented to connect them with the bomb incident.

26. Berger was elected to the state legislature, but he was prohibited from taking his seat. He was subsequently imprisoned, although the Supreme Court set him free.

27. Sacco and Vanzetti were electrocuted for allegedly shooting a guard in a payroll robbery, despite protests at home and around the world.


29. For instance, more than five hundred persons were deported by Palmer, including Emma Goldman, a naturalized citizen.

30. See, for example, Edgar O’Ballance, Terrorism in the 1980s (London: Arms and Armour, 1989).

31. Regarding the last agency, Mitzi Waltz notes, “Reporters covering the fall of Oliver North discovered that from FEMA’s inception in 1979, the agency was handling domestic counterinsurgency planning as well. In 1984, it went so far as to hold national exercises for rounding up and detaining aliens and radicals in rural camps.” See Mitzi Waltz, “Policing Activists: Think Global, Spy Local,” Covert Quarterly Times, Summer, 1997.

32. The Democrats refused to ratify the bill because of a labor issue. The Republicans wanted to prevent an estimated 175,000 OHS employees from
organizing unions, and they also wanted to fire workers who believe they have a right to oppose the government.


34. On the other hand, many felt that the Senate would not delete TIPS when the bill came up. The Democratic majority leader, Senator Tom Daschle, had as little passion for civil liberties as John Ashcroft; consequently, his avoidance of Leahy’s attempt to bring the Bill of Rights into the dispute about the bill was not surprising.

35. Paul Coggins, “The Year of the Rats.”

36. These funds would also be spent on software to integrate the data systems across OHS’s agencies.


38. In 2002, the DoJ had created a database from several thousand interviews of Middle Eastern immigrants. Some FBI officials, however, felt the project would not produce domestic evidence against Al Qaeda, and some civil liberties groups feared it would lead to racial profiling or entrapment. Others felt past abuses might be repeated. “It sounds to me like we are right back in the 1930s, the 1940s and the 1950s,” said Marquette University Professor Athan Theoharis, a leading historian of the FBI and Justice Department.


42. Diane Lane, “Repression Goes Local: Joint Terrorism Task Forces Could Easily Become the New ‘Red Squads,’” Toward Freedom Online Magazine, June 2002, http://www.towardfreedom.com/2002/jun02/laneterror.htm. Diane Lane is a writer, researcher, and member of Portland Copwatch. Paradoxically, the Portland, Oregon, police bureau got into the news by refusing a request by Ashcroft to question two hundred locals of Arab descent. The Portland officials cited a state law that prohibits police from collecting information on any group or individual without a reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior.


45. She also recognized that civil rights advocates had won local, state, and federal restrictions on political surveillance of domestic dissidents. “But their success was short-lived. The Red Squads are back in business with even greater power to pry, harm, and imprison dissidents.”

47. Terrorist attacks against U.S. embassies and an unsuccessful attempt to bomb the World Trade Towers had occurred earlier.

48. The Department of Homeland Security also plans to alter radically the government’s information security response and detection apparatus. It plans to incorporate the FBI’s National Infrastructure Protection Center and the General Services Administration’s Federal Computer Incident Response Center. The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection section of the new department would comprise 976 people with an annual budget of $364 million, according to President Bush’s proposal.

49. See Wayne Madsen, “Homeland Security, Homeland Profits,” *CORPWATCH*, 21 December 2001, http://www.corpwatch.org/issues/PID.jsp?articleid=1108. These systems, according to Madsen, include MAGLOCLEN, which allows police investigators to link activist groups and members through the Link Association Analysis subsystem, a relational database that identifies the “friends and families” of groups and individuals. The Telephone Record Analysis subsystem stores telephone records of groups and individuals. A group’s banking and other commercial data can be monitored by the Financial Analysis subsystem. “And through a system that would have been the envy of J. Edgar Hoover, police and federal agents can also call up profiles that provide specific information on the composition of organizations, including their membership lists.” The Justice Department has also instituted RISSNET II, which networks individual databases within the various RISS centers. The FBI also runs its own intranet called Law Enforcement On-line or LEO, which allows it to communicate intelligence with other law-enforcement agencies.

50. See the website http://epic.org, for further information. The term DCS 1000 replaced Carnivore to make this surveillance program more palatable to the public.

51. Surfing the ACLU “Cyber-Liberties” pages will link people to other free-speech and human-rights websites where there is news about attempts by “California,” “Arizona,” “Ashcroft,” “Great Britain,” “Australia,” “Canada,” “Russia,” etc., to censor the Internet.


53. The same goal is achievable by sabotaging websites with viruses, misinformation, and hoaxes.

54. For example, the Seattle Independent Media Center was launched in fall 1999 to provide coverage of protests against the WTO. A year and a half later, the IMC network had dozens of sites across six continents. Seattle IMC notes, “Each IMC’s news coverage centers upon its open-publishing newswire, an innovative and democratizing system allowing anyone with access to an Internet connection to become a journalist. Open publishing enables the IMC to present local and national issues from diverse perspectives; independent of many filters and biases affecting mainstream media coverage.”
55. Right now, vital information can be found at alternet.org, indynews.com, dc.indymedia.org, counterpunch.org, zmag.org, portside, iacenter.org, freespeech.org, justdissent.org, progressive.org, thenation.com, csf.colorado.edu (Progressive Sociologists Network), aclu.org, aclu-co.org, geocities.org, infoshop.org, italy.indymedia.org, brook.com/cyberbrook, cyber-rights.org (UK), truthout.com, endthewar.org, sundayherald.com (UK), rawa.org, groups.yahoo.com/group/floridaleft/, wiretapmag.org, fair.org, motherjones.com, abolishthebank.org, geocities.com, infoshop.org, workingforchange.org, nlfg.org, justiceandsolidarity.org, commondreams.org, christiansciencemonitor.com, and on and on.


57. In fact, on 19 April, District Judge Thomas Zilly had ruled in Seattle that the Internet firm TheMart.com could not compel an Internet chat room host to identify anonymous users who had criticized the firm online.

58. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay published them under the pen name of Publius.

59. This list is partly derived from Michael Moore, Stupid White Men... and other Sorry Excuses for the State of the Nation! (New York: Regan Books, 2001).

60. That 11 September, in 1973, saw planes leaving one of Chile’s most important buildings in flames and its people in a state of shock. The presidential palace where the elected president, Salvador Allende, died, was also bombed.

61. The ICC treaty has been signed by almost 140 countries, ratified by 66 and took effect 1 July 2002. Bush finally supported the treaty after extorting agreement to place U.S. military forces beyond the reach of the court.

62. Ninety-two young people were dragged from their beds. Sixty were injured and over two dozen were hospitalized.

63. As the police were processing the hundred or so activists, Brendan McCall, who was at the protest with an affinity group from Allegheny College in Pennsylvania, reportedly said that an officer would exclaim, “Get those four,” and four more would be arrested. McCall was surprised at the brutal way in which police responded to any resistance from the youth present.

64. Reportedly, at approximately 8:25 a.m., while these arrests were being processed, police in front of the Marriott Metro Hotel attacked John McGill and a woman friend. McGill, a development consultant for the Agency for International Development, and his friend were bicycling to work. By chance, Police Chief Ramsey and motorcycle officers were converging upon a small group of activists. McGill and friend told Ramsey that they were going to work. Ramsey replied “You didn’t have lights on your bike.” But it was daylight. Ramsey then said, “You didn’t have horns.” The police moved in. McGill’s friend was beaten to the ground by Officer W. C. Harris. John McGill, who met reporters from DC IMC, was looking for a legal observer to help him get his friend out of jail.


66. Shawna Bader, who was also arrested, complained, “Sitting in a park watching people drum and dance is now a crime.”

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Book Reviews

The Soviet Union: “State Capitalist” or “Siege Socialist”?

Andrew Austin


Theories that the Soviet Union was something other than socialist roamed the periphery of left academia and politics throughout the twentieth century. Hillel Ticktin argued that the USSR was neither capitalist nor socialist. In his view, Communist Russia was a historical cul-de-sac, a peculiar and moribund social formation (1973, 1978). Antonio Carlo (1980) and Umberto Melotti (1977) argued that while not capitalist, the USSR was not socialist either. Echoing the earlier theories of James Burnham and Max Shachtman, Carlo and Melotti claimed that it was a bureaucratic collectivist alternative to capitalism. In their view,
the Soviet Union embodied a new mode of production. Tony Cliff (1963) and Raya Dunayevskaya (1992), among others, maintained that the Soviet Union was paradoxically what communists struggled to negate—a capitalist social formation.

Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff’s *Class Theory and History* (2002) is a twenty-first century attempt to portray the Soviet Union as something other than a socialist society. Claiming to have extended Marx’s concept of communism and to have employed an original Marxist theory of social class, the authors produce an analysis of the Soviet Union that is, according to them, distinct from theories promulgated by both defenders and critics of the USSR. Consonant with the judgments of Cliff and Dunayevskaya, the authors conclude that the USSR was a state-capitalist enterprise. Unlike theorists who reached their conclusion based on concepts of hierarchy and power, however, Resnick and Wolff profess to have relied on Marx’s concept of exploitation to reveal the capitalist relations that “comprised the actual class content of Soviet ‘socialism’” (ix).

The prospect of a rigorous study of Russia’s socialist project drew me to consider *Class Theory and History* despite Wolff and Resnick’s questionable interpretation of Marxian class analysis in their 1987 book, *Economics: Marxian versus Neoclassical*. Unfortunately, Resnick and Wolff have neither delivered a rational assessment of the USSR nor revised their earlier position on class. Consistently conflating socialism and communism (attempted clarifications notwithstanding), they theorize from utopian notions of economic democracy. Failing to find the ideal in the real world (for example, worker control of production), they deny the USSR’s socialist character. And, as with *Economics*, their *Class Theory and History* suffers from a fundamentally flawed understanding of the historical-materialist standpoint, chiefly manifest in the refusal of its authors to acknowledge property as a core component of Marx’s conception of social class.

Michael Parenti’s cogent analysis in *Blackshirts and Reds* (1997), published five years before *Class Theory and History*, confutes the shopworn state-capitalist thesis Resnick and Wolff resurrect in their book. Moreover, he anticipates Wolff and Resnick’s
Resnick and Wolff’s tacit acceptance of bourgeois assumptions emerges early in the book when they deny on grounds that the USSR was not socialist the legitimacy of “criticisms that find Soviet socialism or communism to have ‘failed’” (4). Parenti rejects the premise. “To say that ‘socialism doesn’t work,’” he writes, “is to overlook the fact that it did” (85). Parenti challenges the argument that if the Soviet Union were not state capitalist it could be seen as a state with “communist fundamental class processes and classless production arrangements” (Resnick and Wolff 2002, 76), meaning that anything less than a classless society could not represent a form of socialism. Parenti scolds those whose procedure counterposes “pure” socialism to historical or “real, existing” socialism. The notion that socialism only exists where the forces of production are “controlled by the workers themselves through direct participation,” he writes, is “historical and nonfalsifiable” (50–51). In contrast to Resnick and Wolff, Parenti cites the challenge of building socialism in a capitalist world and emphasizes the importance of theorizing from a realistic standpoint. Consequently, Parenti rejects alternative labels and usefully designates the Soviet Union “siege socialist.”

The failings of Class Theory and History in conceptualization and method make it unnecessary to engage the authors’ historiography in depth. Readers interested in comprehensive historiography of the Soviet Union would be wise to look elsewhere. Instead, I take account of the assumptions and arguments that comprise Resnick and Wolff’s thesis and assess their broader interpretation of the class character of the Soviet Union. Of the critics of the state-capitalist thesis mentioned in this essay, Parenti is the best antidote to left anti-Communist scholarship. Consuming far fewer words than Class Theory and History, and comparatively short on detail, Blackshirts and Reds benefits from Parenti’s deep understanding of Marxist class theory and his clear choice of comrades. It is the better work.

According to Resnick and Wolff, the two dominant approaches to the study of social class have heretofore posited either property relations or distribution of power as the determining features of class structure. In the former theory, ownership of the means
of production—the basis of the social relations of production—
establishes social class. In the latter, class is determined by who
gives and who takes orders. The concept of class as power and
authority is characteristic of previous state-capitalist theories. In
contrast to property and power conceptualizations, Resnick and
Wolff focus on the production, appropriation, and distribution of
social surplus. They write:

Any society’s class structure refers to how it organizes its
population in relation to the surplus as (1) surplus produc-
ers, (2) surplus appropriators (and hence distributors), and/
or (3) recipients of distributed shares of the surplus. (xi)

This “surplus labor” definition of class is, according to them,
Marx’s definition. Consistent with their approach in Economics,
Resnick and Wolff present no textual evidence to support their
claim that their method corresponds to Marx’s.

The surplus theory of class, Resnick and Wolff aver, permits
a clear demarcation between communist and capitalist class
structures. In a *communist class structure*, the producers and the
appropriators of the social product are the same persons (begging
the question of how a class structure continues in a social forma-
tion where social class has been abolished). Laborers produce
use-values and share or consume them. A capitalist class structure
is one in which producers and appropriators are different persons.
Therefore, exploitation occurs under capitalism because those who
do not produce a surplus (capitalists) appropriate surplus labor
from those who produce it (proletarians). Reprising the standard
state-capitalist formulation, Resnick and Wolff argue that capital-
ist exploitation can take two forms: (1) “private capitalism,” in
which nonstate actors are the appropriators, and (2) “state capital-
ism,” in which state actors are the appropriators. In their view, the
latter designation is the appropriate one for the Soviet Union.

Resnick and Wolff arrive at this judgment mainly via a pro-
cess of exclusion. They claim that Marxists recognize three basic
forms of exploitative class structures: slave, feudal, and capitalist.
In each structure, nonproducers appropriate the surplus. In order
to know which form of exploitative class structure is present, one
must establish the manner by which exploiters appropriate the
surplus. Borrowing Althusserian jargon, Resnick and Wolff write that this “requires examination of how [a society’s] particular nonclass processes combine to overdetermine its class structures” (89). Looking at Soviet history, the authors find that slave relations existed neither in the sense that human beings were property nor in the differentiation of society into master and slave power categories (Bruno Rizzi would disagree!). Resnick and Wolff reach a similar conclusion with respect to feudal relations; generally absent in Soviet society were “formal relationships of interpersonal bondage” (89). That Soviet society was neither slave nor feudal means that, by elimination, it was capitalist.

Seemingly aware of the flimsiness of this argument, Resnick and Wolff defend their position by claiming that they did not judge the Soviet Union to be a capitalist society merely by eliminating the presence of other class structures. They suggest other points of convergence between Western capitalist countries and the class structure of the Soviet Union: Soviet industrial ministries were similar to the corporate boards of capitalist monopolies; workers in Russia, just as in capitalist countries, were compelled by mechanisms of structural coercion to sell their labor power; exploitation of the proletariat is a feature of both contexts, although in Russia it occurred in state-run enterprises. The authors find especially important the phenomenon of a discourse of freedom, rights, and equivalent voluntary exchange masking the exploitation of the Soviet worker. “Precisely this situation—limited freedom coexisting with a structured compulsion to produce surplus for others without seeing the class process involved—resembles no other class structure so much as the condition of workers in private capitalist structures around the world” (90). As I will later show, none of these ancillary points saves *Class Theory and History* from suffering the same fate as its predecessors.

After reviewing debates over the state-capitalism thesis (chapter 4), the authors devote the remainder of the book (part 3) to the rise and fall of the USSR. Using a parallel demonstration procedure that is more illustrative than evaluative, they argue that since the surplus was produced in state enterprises, then appropriated and distributed by state entities such as the *Veshenka* (the
Supreme Council of National Economy, later reorganized as the Council of Ministers), the Soviet Union was state capitalist. “The state bureaucrats leading this council functioned similarly to a centralized board of directors of a private capitalist industrial combine,” they write. Resnick and Wolff claim *argumentum ad populum*, that most historians “admit that the council functioned like a private capitalist board of directors” (166), yet err when identifying the fundamental difference between a board of directors and the *Veshenka*—namely that council members were appointed by the state, and that the economy was a state-planned, command affair whose class structure was distinguished by the collective ownership of the means of production. The problem with this explanation, in Resnick and Wolff’s view, is that it assumes “the theoretical framework that distinguishes capitalism from socialism and communism by reference to which group wields power over productive enterprises” (166). If historians adopted the surplus-labor definition instead, the fact that the *Veshenka* appropriated surplus would have compelled them to conclude that the Soviet Union was capitalist.

* * * *

The problems with *Class Theory and History* are numerous. First, the existence of bourgeois characteristics does not mean that a social formation rests upon a capitalist mode of production. Marx emphasizes in his “Critique of the Gotha Program” that the initial stage of communism—what he described as “crude communism” in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* (1975, 294–96)—is a social order emerging from the womb of capitalism. As such, socialism, as Lenin saw it, retains characteristics of bourgeois society, namely the existence of wage labor and the right of inequality. Yet, crude communism differs from capitalism because the social surplus is invested in the reproduction and expansion of the forces of production and the elaboration of social services for the benefit of the proletariat rather than being appropriated by private entities. Extraction of the surplus from workers cannot therefore be in itself an indication of capitalist class relations. As Marx points out in chapter 49 of *Capital 3*, “accumulation, and hence expansion of
the process of reproduction even after the abolition of the capitalist mode of production” would continue (1996b, 834). Moreover, the existence of value will continue to prevail after capitalism:

After the abolition of the capitalist mode of production, but still retaining social production, the determination of value continues to prevail in the sense that the regulation of labour time and the distribution of social labour among the various production groups, ultimately the bookkeeping encompassing all this, become more essential than ever. (Marx, 1996b, 838)

Second, early in the Soviet Union’s development, the Bolsheviks combined features of central planning with retained capitalist relations and processes. Soviet leaders placed the economy under the control of the State General Planning Commission, or Gosplan. The state controlled heavy industry, finance, and foreign trade. However, with the New Economic Policy (NEP) of 1921, the worker-state permitted private agricultural production, retail trade, and control of small industries. The arrangement lasted less than a decade. Stalin established a command economy and emplaced successive programs of rapid industrialization and agricultural collectivization. To be sure, there were other moments of devolution similar to the NEP retreat. In a move to increase efficiency, for instance, Khrushchev permitted local councils to assume many of the functions of state ministries. Yet, each of these moments was eventually negated (for example, Brezhnev curtailed or eliminated Khrushchev’s reforms), and their bourgeois character is in every instance doubtful. It was not until Gorbachev and perestroika that the Soviet government permitted such bourgeois entities as small private businesses and forms of corporations.

Third, in confirming the absence of slave and feudal class structures in Soviet society, the authors rely on the two conceptualizations of social class they earlier rejected as inadequate: the distribution of property and power. The authors must turn to these other features of social class because their conceptualization of class as surplus labor is too abstract and incomplete to differentiate between concrete modes of production. To cover their resort
to other criteria, they sneak them in through the back door using a rhetorical sleight-of-hand—they define property and power as “nonclass processes.” Yet Marxists conceptualize property and power, along with surplus appropriation, as central and interconnected features of social class. It is through power derived from property that nonproducers expropriate the product of producers. “Slave masters and slaves constitute classes,” notes Erik Olin Wright, “because a particular property relation (property rights in people) generates exploitation (the appropriation of the fruits of labor of the slave by the slave master)” (1997, 17, emphasis added). That exploitation takes place is a fact insufficient for determining the character of an exploitative class structure. One identifies a particular class structure by the concrete configurations of these several elements.

Resnick and Wolff’s neglect of property relations contradicts Marx’s concept of social class (a fact that would not necessarily undermine the book if its authors did not claim that they derive their thesis from Marxian thought). Marx emphasizes in *Capital 1* that “ownership of past unpaid labour”—i.e. capital—is “the sole condition for the appropriation of living unpaid labour on a constantly increasing scale” (1996a, 582). In other words, “property turns out to be the right, on the part of the capitalist, to appropriate the unpaid labour of others or its product” (583). Property rights derive from “the economic laws of commodity production” (1967, 585), which presuppose a historic process that “takes away from the labourer the possession of his means of production” (1996a, 705). Essential to Marx’s theory is the argument that, although surplus production and appropriation occur in previous and other modes of production, the mechanisms by which these operate (the forms they take and their effects) differ fundamentally from those of the capitalist mode of production. At the core of this difference are the private ownership of capital by the capitalist and the ownership of labor power by the worker. Since private ownership of capital is, for a Marxist, one of the principal components of capitalism, it is unreasonable to continue calling something capitalist when revolution abolishes its defining economic relation and negates its legal categories.
Others working with the tools of historical materialism echo Marx’s emphasis on property relations. Even while his reformulation of Marx’s class analysis emphasizes authority relations, Erik Olin Wright observes in *Class Counts*, “Within the Marxist tradition of class analysis, class divisions are defined primarily in terms of the linkage between property relations and exploitation” (1997, 17). Elsewhere Wright notes:

Ownership of the means of production and ownership of one’s own labor power are explanatory of social action because these property rights shape the strategic alternatives people face in pursuing their material well-being. . . . [In short,] What people have imposes constraints on what they can do to get what they want. (1996, 695, emphasis in the original)

In Blackwell’s *Dictionary of Marxist Thought*, András Hegedüs cites Oskar Lange’s characterization of property as the “organizing principle” of capitalism, one that “determines both the relations of production and the relations of distribution.” Hegedüs sums up his own view in the following fashion:

In Marxist social theory the notion of property and some related categories (property relations, forms of property) have a central significance. Marx did not regard property only as the possibility for the owner to exercise property rights, or as an object of such activity, but as an essential relationship which has a central role in the complex system of classes and social strata. Within this system of categories, the ownership of means of production has outstanding importance. (1991, 450)

Mainstream sociologists also grasp the central role property plays in class analysis from a Marxian perspective. The late Aage B. Sørensen, an authority on social stratification models, argues that Marx’s conception of class is based on property rights. At the same time, Sørensen recognizes that the core process of class relations is exploitation—that is, the worker enriches the capitalist because part of the surplus produced in the labor process is appropriated by the capitalist. These elements of the theory—property
and exploitation—are what make Marx’s project the most theoretically ambitious class-analytical framework, Sørensen contends. “It not only provides an explanation for inequality, it also points to an effective remedy: one must change the class relations that create exploitation” (2000, 1529). Sørensen comprehends the essential point that property creates the opportunity for capitalists to exploit workers. Property is the means of exploitation.

With the importance of property relations in mind, David Lane, in “The Structure of Soviet Socialism,” rejects the state-capitalist argument. “The supposed ‘capitalist class’ is left with no proprietary rights” (1984, 104). Although state managers and administrators controlled Soviet production enterprises, they could “neither dispose of their assets for their private good nor have their children receive any exclusive rights to nationalized property.” Under the Soviet state, “no identifiable group of persons” enjoyed “a source of income derived from the ownership of property” (104). Moreover, Lane notes, such theories explicitly or implicitly privilege authority and control of the means of production over ownership. It is not just that they mix up the order of things—control substitutes for ownership in state-capitalist theory. For Lane, such an approach, consistent with most bourgeois sociology, pays “little attention to the definition of class boundaries” (103).

Resnick and Wolff criticize state-capitalist theorists who place too much emphasis on authority and control (111–26), but then fail to counter this one-sided conceptualization with a comprehensive definition of social class that includes property relations. Substituting exploitation for power without recognizing the historical property relations that stamp both with their specific class characteristic does not enhance the efficacy of state-capitalist theory. This problem is shown clearly when Resnick and Wolff criticize those historians who believe that the Veshenka was “marked by collective (rather than private) ownership of the means of production” (166). The authors are really indicating that the explanations with which they take issue are not those that founder on an abstract conception of power, but rather those that root power in property relations. The fact that the “board of directors” of a Soviet industrial ministry was answerable to the politburo instead of to shareholders is only
irrelevant to Resnick and Wolff’s analysis because they ignore the role of property in social relations.

From the standpoint of a comprehensive conceptualization of social class, questions concerning the class character of a social system must take a different form. Were property relations in the Soviet Union like those that exist under capitalism? In a capitalist system, viewed from a historical-materialist perspective, we expect to find at least one class that privately owns and controls capital, extracts surplus value from workers in a wage-labor system, and realizes this value in a commercial market as profit. This class accumulates capital to strengthen its hold on society and increases the rate of exploitation to enrich itself. Similarly, we might ask whether collective ownership of the means of production in a society led by communists describes the Soviet Union. In a socialist society, we would expect to find a communist party planning the economy with the goal of creating a level of productive capacity sufficient for raising social life onto a higher stage of human development. Resnick and Wolff avoid such falsifiable questions by denying the importance of property relations in determining social class and substituting an ahistorical conception of surplus labor extraction.

* * * * *

According to Michael Parenti in *Blackshirts and Reds*, socialist societies achieved a much greater degree of material equality than their capitalist counterparts. Soviet leaders organized the productive forces in the Soviet Union for the advancement of the proletariat, not for private enrichment or capital gain. “Individuals could not hire other people and accumulate great personal wealth from their labor” (1997, 50). The means of production were not privately held but were publicly owned. Human services were extensive and comprehensive. Soviet citizens were assured a “minimal standard of economic survival and security, including guaranteed education, employment, housing, and medical assistance” (50). It distorts Soviet history to suggest, as Resnick and Wolff do, that Communist ministers were rewarded or behaved like capitalists and their managers in Western nations.
The perks enjoyed by Party and government elites were modest by Western corporate CEO standards, as were their personal incomes and life styles. Soviet leaders like Yuri Andropov and Leonid Brezhnev lived not in lavishly appointed mansions like the White House, but in relatively large apartments in a housing project near the Kremlin set aside for government leaders. They had limousines at their disposal (like most other heads of state) and access to large dachas where they entertained visiting dignitaries. But they had none of the immense personal wealth that most U.S. leaders possess. (Parenti 1997, 49)

What was true of relations internal to the Soviet Union—that there was a greater degree of equality in Russia than in capitalist countries—was true of external relations between Russia and its allied countries. The Soviet Union did not pursue capital penetration of other socialist countries. On the contrary, its allied countries uniformly benefited from their relationships with the Soviet Union. “Lacking a profit motive” as a motor force, writes Parenti, the USSR “did not expropriate the lands, labor, markets, and natural resources of weaker nations” (50). In other words, the USSR “did not practice economic imperialism.” Instead, it intended its interventions to facilitate the development of alternatives to capitalism in the periphery of the world system and to strengthen socialist governments against insurgency.

In contrast to those U.S. leftists who “say that the communist states offered nothing more than bureaucratic, one-party ‘state capitalism’ or some such thing,” writes Parenti, the Soviet Union “constituted something different from what existed in the profit-driven capitalist world” (49). Anticipating Resnick and Wolff’s “surplus theory of class,” Parenti acknowledges the fact that the Soviet Union had to expropriate the surplus produced by labor “to rebuild society and defend it from invasion and internal sabotage” (51). Again, this was as Marx said it would have to be after the abolition of the capitalist mode of production (1996b, 991). As noted, because the Soviet Union faced threats to its existence both from the capitalist world encircling it and reactionary forces internal to it, Parenti characterizes its system as “siege socialism.”
Shirley Cereseto lends empirical weight to Parenti’s claims (1982). Drawing on Marx’s theory that historically specific laws of motion govern social systems, Cereseto finds that the socialist world system rested on developmental principles fundamentally different from the capitalist world system. Under capitalism, the law of accumulation, because of its emphasis on profit maximization in the context of private property relations, inexorably leads to concentrated wealth and uneven development both in the internal structure of bourgeois societies and in the external relations among capitalist nations. Under “real, existing socialism,” the means of production were publicly owned and the imperative of profit maximization was abolished. Production was planned to meet basic human needs (Cereseto 1982, 21–22). The results were less inequality, falling poverty, greater economic security, and a higher quality of life. Moreover, these results occurred during periods of rapid economic growth. One should expect the opposite if capitalist laws were in operation. Cereseto concludes that “the new social formations” were “neither capitalist nor communist, but rather as being in the early stages of the long, arduous transition from one to the other” (6). These stages comprise what Marx called the “first phase of communist society” (1989, 87), which contains the deficiencies of the society from which they emerge. “They contain many other defects as well, some of which arise from errors made while traversing the yet uncharted, obstacle-laden path to communism,” writes Cereseto. “Yet, the data . . . clearly distinguish them from capitalist societies” (1982, 6).

Alex Dupuy and Barry Truchil mount a critique of state–capitalist theory similar to Parenti’s. They contend that economic relations, such as commodity and labor markets, must be reckoned in terms of state ownership and control. Granting that the law of value continued to operate in the Soviet Union, Dupuy and Truchil argue that it was constrained by and subordinated to state economic planning. The surplus was used to achieve the goals of a socialist society, not for private enrichment. If by “commodity market” one understands a mechanism that regulates the operation of productive enterprises on the basis of supply and demand, then the Soviet Union cannot be said to have been a market economy.
Productive investments in the Soviet Union were decided on the basis of social need and not on the profitability of enterprises. As Marx predicted, where capitalistic forms of accounting were used, they were used “primarily as measures of efficiency and accountability,” serving “to modify and correct former planned projections” (Dupuy and Truchil 1979, 28). The money form used for accounting purposes was not a source of accumulation. Indeed, because of state planning, Dupuy and Truchil contend the capital-goods sector had lost its commodity form. Moreover, wages served more as a rational means of distribution rather than a mechanism of exploitation.

The notion that state and party functionaries (apparatchiki) represented the functional equivalent of the capitalist class fails to differentiate accurately among various strata of the Soviet state, and to identify precisely which stratum corresponds to the capitalist class. It also fails to acknowledge the central reality that bureaucrats could not “accumulate wealth for their own private ends, viz., they [could not] accumulate wealth to purchase means of production or labor-power: the prerequisites for the existence of a capitalist class” (Dupuy and Truchil 1979, 30). Directly contradicting one of Resnick and Wolff’s main contentions, Dupuy and Truchil emphasize the fact that the privileged position of state officials, which existed by “virtue of their position within the state apparatus,” did not “result from the retention of capitalist forms of distribution, i.e., the wage system and of commodity production in the consumer goods sectors” (30).

In sum, the proponents of the state-capitalist thesis for describing the socialist countries have not demonstrated that capitalist relations of production indeed predominated in those societies. Their analyses start from a certain set of sociopolitical contradictions—namely the absence of workers’ control and the extant hierarchical social division of labor between state bureaucrats and workers. From these contradictions they then generate a theory of state capitalism by postulating the resurgence and dominance of capitalist relations of production, without ever demonstrating that this has occurred. (Dupuy and Truchil 1979, 30–31)
On the questions of the law of value, state planning, and the functional equivalency of the *apparatchiki* and the bourgeoisie, Dupuy and Truchil “maintain that these societies must still be considered socialist in character” (28). This conclusion is as relevant to the present critique of *Class Theory and History* as it was for those upon whom Dupuy and Truchil turned their critical eye.

* * * * *

Theorizing from the concrete totality is the foundation of the historical-materialist method. Marx argues in the *Grundrisse* that the categories of political economy become empty abstractions if conceptualization substantially removes determinant relations from concrete historical arrangements (1986). One can only speak of production at a definite stage of social development—that is, as socially determined production. It is not the mere presence of private property or surplus appropriation that distinguishes social classes. Indeed, as Wright points out, the fact of property rights alone is insufficient for judging social class. “Homeowners and the homeless would not constitute ‘classes’ even though they are distinguished by property rights in housing since this division does not constitute a basis for the exploitation of the homeless by homeowners” (17). It is rather the historically specific character of private property and the socially determined manner in which the surplus is appropriated and to what ends that surplus is put that shape the identity of the class structure. Capitalism is varied, and so therefore are the categories abstracted from its historical forms; but these categories, precisely because they are abstractions from the concrete, are not so malleable as to apply to radically different social formations. To accomplish this, one must evacuate their empirical contents in the manner of the functionalist.

Resnick and Wolff’s conceptualization of social class conflicts with Marx’s method not so much in its attention to the question of social surplus as in its habit of improper abstraction and its denial of the centrality of concrete property relations. In sum, the framework of *Class Theory and History* is insufficiently discriminatory to support a claim that the Soviet Union was state capitalist, and tightening up their method shows the falsity of their conclusion.
Ultimately, *Class Theory and History* feigns historical materialism, just as did *Economics: Marxian versus Neoclassical* (1987) before it. Consider these representative statements: “The Soviet victories of collective over private property and of planning over markets altered how workers continued to be exploited [but] did not eliminate the worker’s exploitation” (Resnick and Wolff 2002, 91). “The personnel changed (no doubt a significant event), but the exploitative juxtaposition of producers vis-à-vis appropriators of surplus labor did not” (162). These statements exemplify the level of abstraction at which the authors operate. While such statements may be true, they are irrelevant to the question the book poses, namely, *Was the Soviet Union a state-capitalist social formation?* (Does anybody really argue that the Soviet Union was a communist society?) The appearance of historical materialism in the book is achieved through the appropriation of Marxian terminology in phrases such as, “the rate of surplus value appropriation (exploitation) inside state capitalist industry” (239). Surplus value, the form social surplus takes under capitalist relations, is thus “discovered” in various places in Soviet society. Each such discovery is prefixed with the term “state capitalist.” The practice of assuming what must be demonstrated cannot pass for Marxist class analysis.

Unlike those who avoid anti-Communist flak with such argument as “the communist or socialist alternative to capitalism never prevailed” (Resnick and Wolff 2002, 4), Parenti confronts history in *Blackshirts and Reds*, acknowledging that Communist countries suffered from major system deficiencies (1997, 59), while at the same time reiterating the stubborn fact that “socialism transformed desperately poor countries into modernized societies” (85).

To be sure, capitalism comes in many forms. Modern Sweden is quite different from Nazi Germany, and the U.S. system differs from either of these societies. Yet, these social formations—all capitalist—share in varying degrees the following features:

1. Capital is privately owned and controlled.
2. Commodity production is conducted primarily for
exchange in markets and the generation of profit, not for personal use-values to be consumed by immediate producers.

3. Profits are reinvested to generate more profits for private individuals, not for generating public goods and services benefiting the whole population.

4. A labor market exists wherein labor power is exchanged for wages under conditions of structural coercion.

5. Decisions concerning investment, production, and distribution are for the most part made by private entities not collectivities.

6. The owners of capital and their managers ultimately control the labor process.

7. The money-commodity is the near-universal medium of exchange.

Judged by these criteria, Nazi Germany merits the designation “state capitalist.” This designation does not accurately describe the historical character of the Soviet Union.

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ABSTRACTS

Joel Wendland, “‘Mutual Dependence’ and Subversive Work: Exploring Dialectics of Race, Gender, and Labor in the Antebellum United States”—This essay presents close readings of James Fenimore Cooper’s *The Pioneers* and Harriet E. Wilson’s *Our Nig* against the background of actual social conditions in the period 1820–1860. The interactive processes of the conditions of emerging industrial capitalist relations, the formation of racialized subjectivities, and patriarchal relations are placed in a materialist framework. The author explores the dialectical formation of laboring positions as the predominant subjectivity and shows the material and cultural resistances as well as transformative acts of rebellion against the developing hierarchies.

Domenico Losurdo, “History of the Communist Movement: Failure, Betrayal, or Learning Process?”—Dominant historiography of the twentieth century views the outcome of the conflict between Communism and capitalism as a victory of democracy over a failed Communism. A different approach to the interpretation of the history of Communism, popular among some Communists, is to explain the collapse of the Communist-led community of nations by betrayal, with the chief villain identified as either Stalin or Khrushchev. Betrayal does not explain either the tensions that developed among the socialist states, or the wide range of economic and political difficulties this new social system had to face in its confrontation with imperialism. The Communist movement in the twentieth century must be seen as a learning process in which experience has been gained that will contribute to future developments in the process of replacing capitalist with socialist relations of production.

Herman and Julia Schwendinger, “Big Brother Is Looking at You, Kid: InfoTech and Weapons of Mass Repression. Part 1”—Although the Nazi regime—with the aid of IBM and its subsidiaries—innovated modern information technology as a weapon of tyranny and mass control, the current expansion of this technology in the United States is unprecedented. Assaults on civil liberties by Bush and Ashcroft are not a historical aberration, but knowledge of the history of such assaults would not enable one to predict the degree and sophistication of current repression. United States government policies are now constructing a colossal apparatus for identifying and controlling political dissenters, justifying the current surveillance of antiwar, antiglobalization, and environmentalist movements by a new round of “Big Lies” and wars of aggression.

ABREGES


Domenico Losurdo, « L’histoire du mouvement communiste : L’échec, la trahison, ou un processus d’apprentissage? » —
L’historiographie dominante du vingtième siècle voit l’aboutissement du conflit entre le communisme et le capitalisme comme une victoire de la démocratie contre un communisme en échec. Une approche différente de l’interprétation de l’histoire du communisme, défendue par certains communistes, est d’expliquer la chute de la communauté communiste par la trahison, en désignant soit Staline soit Khrushchev comme traître principal. La trahison n’explique ni les tensions qui se sont développées parmi les états socialistes, ni la vaste spectre des difficultés économiques et politiques à laquelle ce nouveau système social a dû faire face dans sa confrontation avec l’impérialisme. Le mouvement communiste du vingtième siècle doit être vu comme un processus d’apprentissage, dont l’expérience favorisera les développements futurs du processus de remplacement des rapports de production capitalistes par des rapports socialistes.

Herman et Julia Schwendinger, « Big Brother te regarde, mon enfant : l’info-tech et les armes de répression massives. Première partie » — Bien que le régime nazi — avec l’aide d’IBM et ses filiales — avait institué l’utilisation des technologies modernes de l’information comme instruments de tyrannie de contrôle des masses, l’expansion actuelle de cette technologie aux États-Unis reste sans précédent. Les assauts contre les libertés civiles menés par Bush et Ashcroft ne constituent pas une aberration historique, mais connaître l’histoire de tels assauts ne permettrait pas d’évaluer le degré et la sophistication de la répression actuelle. La politique du gouvernement des États-Unis est en train de construire un appareil colossal d’identification et de contrôle des dissidents politiques, tout en justifiant la surveillance des mouvements anti-guerre, anti-mondialisation et écologistes par une nouvelle série de «grands mensonges» et guerres d’agression.